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ABSTRACT 
What constitutes an effective Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) 
protection program for Massachusetts? This study evaluates existing literature regarding 
CIKR to extrapolate an infrastructure protection role for Massachusetts. By reviewing 
historical events and government strategies regarding infrastructure protection, Chapters I 
and II will provide scope and context for issues surrounding critical infrastructure. 
Chapter III reviews the roles of the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of Defense, possibly the two most influential organizations tasked to support 
the federal infrastructure protection initiative.  
Chapter IV analyzes the private-sector role in infrastructure protection as 
articulated in federal strategies, academic research, federally directed studies, and 
professional journals. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s framework for 
managing the risk to CIKR will be used as a guide in Chapter V to evaluate the 
infrastructure protection strategies of Arizona, Virginia, and Washington. 
Finally, Chapter VI recommends that Massachusetts develop a state infrastructure 
assurance program vice a Critical Infrastructure Protection Program. Concepts such as 
reframing the critical infrastructure debate, creating infrastructure public/private 
partnerships and information sharing processes to build trust among the entities invested 
in ensuring the delivery of infrastructure services are recommended for inclusion in a 
state infrastructure assurance strategy and subsequent infrastructure assurance program. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis serves to identify strategic roles that the state of Massachusetts should fulfill 
to effectively secure the delivery of infrastructure services within its jurisdiction. Review 
of federal Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) plans and strategies, other 
states’ CIKR protection plans or strategies, academic research and other writings on the 
topic provide sufficient rationale to propose a state government role in Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP). The conclusions garnered from this research provide the 
framework for an effective infrastructure assurance program and a CIKR assurance 
strategy for the state of Massachusetts. A successful infrastructure assurance program 
would require the following steps to be implemented: 
 
• Reframe the infrastructure protection narrative;  
• Develop resilience in infrastructure and the public; 
• Write a state CIKR protection strategy and develop an effective state CIP 
program;  
• Select an experienced, knowledgeable and influential individual to lead 
the CIP effort;  
• Educate CIP practitioners, politicians and the public; 
• Develop appropriate public/private partnerships and sector-specific 
councils; and  
• Create trust through transparent information sharing.  
A. REFRAME THE NARRATIVE 
1. Infrastructure Assurance 
It is necessary to reframe the CIKR protection narrative in order to effectively 
manage the viability of infrastructure in this country. The nation’s current infrastructure 
narrative became focused on security of infrastructure rather than ensuring that  
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infrastructure remains viable to deliver service. This narrative has been further distorted 
since 9/11, when the definition of “critical infrastructure” expanded to our current list of 
18 CIKR sectors. 
To better focus the infrastructure assurance effort and rein in the critical 
infrastructure mission creep, it is necessary to better define what infrastructure is critical 
as opposed to what is normal. The overarching infrastructure narrative should be oriented 
toward the assured delivery of services, rather than simply protecting CIKR. The goal of 
an infrastructure assurance strategy would be to provide targeted support to the 
infrastructure sectors, both from government and the private sector, so that quality 
services are delivered consistently and—if there is a disruption—that “critical” service is 
returned as quickly as practical. Services deemed to be critical would receive priority 
support toward the assured delivery of service based upon a predefined ranking structure 
or process. 
2. The New Critical 
Within the state of Massachusetts infrastructure effort there should be two distinct 
categories of infrastructure: one “critical,” the other “normal.” Infrastructure deemed 
“critical” would qualify for regular maintenance support and prioritized protection effort, 
while the infrastructure deemed “normal” would qualify for the investment of resources 
oriented toward regular maintenance. During recovery operations in the aftermath of a 
significant manmade or natural disaster, infrastructure providing critical service would 
receive priority efforts to restore its associated service. Assurance of service requires the 
investment of capital and other resources in both types of infrastructure. Both types of 
infrastructure should be designed and operated with resilience in mind.  
3. Understanding the Threat 
The infrastructure protection debate needs to be reframed in the context of better 
understanding the threats from which we are trying to secure infrastructure.  
An accurate threat picture is necessary to conduct worthwhile risk assessments that drive 
infrastructure assurance decisions. Excluding the attacks of 9/11, the direct result of the 
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majority of terror attacks does not achieve the level of strategic effect that warrants the 
expenditure of resources applied by the United States across the many infrastructure 
sectors. Experienced state CIP practitioners need to engage the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and challenge the homeland security paradigm, specifically in the area of 
risk assessment and threat assessment. State CIP practitioners should be informed and 
experienced in the spectrum of threats enough to challenge threat and risk assessments 
that don’t comport with their understanding of the regional threat. The aggregate of 
localized threat should be contained in an annual risk assessment that provides a context 
to understand how a threat may make CIKR in our region vulnerable. 
B. DEVELOP RESILIENCE IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC 
A state CIP program should be involved in identifying critical infrastructure in its 
jurisdiction worthy of investment in redundant capacity and helping to guide the 
development and implementation of effective management processes to avoid or respond 
to infrastructure disruptions. The federal solution of creating resilience to mitigate the 
effects of either man-made or natural threats is encouraged through the 2009 NIPP. 
Resilience is the best alternative to mitigate the spectrum of predictable and unpredictable 
threats facing infrastructure. Infrastructure resilience to threats of man or nature can be 
achieved by creating redundant capacity through construction of back-up facilities to 
replace damaged buildings or through effective management processes and procedures 
that avoid disasters or efficiently recover from them. Building redundancy through back-
up buildings or through engineering more robust systems can be prohibitively expensive. 
The state infrastructure assurance program can assist the federal government, the 
state government, the private sector, and the public to develop the appropriate resiliency. 
The state infrastructure assurance program should also help emergency managers and 
private sector asset owners to coordinate and exercise effective response capability within 
their jurisdiction. State government has a role to enhance the resilience of its population 
by building the resolve and capacity of the population to support itself for short periods 
during an emergency.  
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C. DEVELOP A STATE INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE STRATEGY 
AND AN EFFECTIVE INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 
1. Infrastructure Strategy 
At this time, Massachusetts is without a state CIKR protection strategy. The state 
must develop a strategy oriented toward a new concept of overall infrastructure assurance 
to include a more focused component that addresses CIKR protection of assets 
warranting a greater level of support. State government roles must be articulated in a 
comprehensive infrastructure protection strategy that acknowledges the various efforts of 
public- and private-sector partners and synchronizes those efforts toward insuring the 
delivery of infrastructure services in the jurisdiction. To synergize with the federal CIKR 
effort, Massachusetts should develop a strategy that utilizes the NIPP risk management 
framework as a guideline, similar to the strategies of the commonwealth of Virginia and 
the state of Washington. With respect to synchronizing partnerships, there are elements of 
the Virginia and Washington plans that bear inclusion in the Massachusetts strategy. In 
addition to incorporating some of the highlights from the Virginia and Washington plans, 
Massachusetts should develop more detailed goals, define who is responsible to 
accomplish those goals, and legislate funding to sustain the initiative. 
2. State Infrastructure Program 
The state of Massachusetts must create a broad infrastructure assurance (IA) 
program that focuses on assuring infrastructure’s consistent delivery of service. The 
program must be mandated in legislation. The infrastructure assurance program would 
maintain an inventory of the “normal” infrastructure, as well as the “critical” 
infrastructure. Within the state infrastructure assurance program, there must be a 
subgroup that focuses exclusively on the “critical” infrastructure in the state and on steps 
to ensure that critical infrastructure is effectively secured from threats.  
The infrastructure assurance program should be made up of members representing 
multiple disciplines and multiple agencies from state and federal government, and it 
should include representatives from the private sector and academia. A broad coalition of 
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team members will ensure a breadth of experience and professionalism and will act to 
spread the burden of inventorying and assessing infrastructure assets within the state 
across all interested entities. Considering the task of the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
secure the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and a state’s obligation to assist the DoD in that 
regard, the state’s national guard should have representatives on the teams. 
D. STATE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM LEADER 
Much as an orchestra is led by a conductor, the IA program will require a leader 
to arrange the appropriate scores or plans, cultivate members’ skills, and blend the skills 
to achieve an effective program. The stable of IA program members can be likened to the 
members of an orchestra with honed skills who require organization to produce a 
symphony. The current CIP program of the state of Massachusetts should become the 
infrastructure assurance program within the office of the Secretary of Public Safety, 
directed by the Under Secretary for Homeland Security. The under secretary is better 
positioned to engender the cooperation and goodwill of the many entities with a vested 
interest in CIP. Whoever leads this program should posses the organizational skills of a 
maestro and demonstrate the ability to orchestrate a multiagency, multidisciplined effort. 
E. EDUCATE CIP PRACTITIONERS AND POLITICIANS 
The current CIP practitioner’s challenge to secure CIKR is compounded by a 
limited understanding of the composition of modern infrastructure, the interconnections 
and dependencies between assets within an infrastructure sector and across sectors, and 
the nature and degree of threats that make CIKR vulnerable, and from a lack of credible 
data that validates which protection actions are the most effective and resource-efficient 
to ensure the delivery of service. An initial objective of the state strategy is to promote a 
mechanism to develop the appropriate knowledge and skills in the infrastructure 
assurance program members and a corporate understanding of what is critical in the 
infrastructure sectors represented in Massachusetts. That corporate knowledge can be 
developed, consolidated, and shared in local colleges or shared in public-private 
partnerships.  
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The education and research efforts undertaken by George Mason University in 
partnership with government and private industry should be a model for Massachusetts to 
mirror in one of its local universities. State infrastructure assurance practitioners can hone 
their skills in such an academic relationship while academics would benefit from their 
interaction with private-sector and public-sector CIP practitioners who may share ideas 
about the direction that research should take. Ultimately, public- and private-sector CIP 
practitioners’ participation in CIP educational opportunities offered at universities and 
colleges will foster the development of future “maestros” and “virtuosos” of homeland 
security. 
The director of the state IA program should engage local and state politicians to 
encourage their support of the goal of statewide infrastructure assurance. Political support 
can be made more effective by educating politicians about infrastructure assurance. 
Political support and understanding of the infrastructure assurance goal may help to 
eliminate the manipulation of public fears in order to gain consensus toward funding 
security programs that are not necessary. Politicians may best serve the infrastructure 
assurance effort by endorsing more research in the areas of infrastructure 
interdependencies, network vulnerabilities, and metrics to measure the effectiveness of 
infrastructure protection efforts; by promoting education and training for CIP 
practitioners; and by promoting public-private partnerships.  
F. DEVELOP PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND SECTOR-
SPECIFIC COUNCILS 
The state of Massachusetts should develop public-private partnerships to facilitate 
its infrastructure assurance initiative. The infrastructure assurance partnership should be 
organized along the lines of a “megacommunity” partnership. The megacommunity 
partnership concept primarily consists of three sectors: government, civil society, and 
business. The objective of Massachusetts government should be to exploit the dynamic 
tension between the three primary sectors mentioned above to unify infrastructure 
assurance partnerships toward achieving a common interest of infrastructure assurance.  
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The state infrastructure assurance program must encourage the partnerships but 
not feel compelled to lead the partnership effort. The need is not for a single leader for 
these partnerships but rather a common understanding of the objective of infrastructure 
assurance and a corporate desire to achieve it. The partnerships should be encouraged to 
self-govern their actions and work cohesively toward achieving the state’s strategic 
objectives. 
In addition to developing partnerships, the state of Massachusetts would be well 
served to develop state sector-specific councils (SSSC). The directors of the SSSCs 
would report to the director of the state infrastructure assurance program. One significant 
benefit of the SSSC is that the state is able to delegate responsibility for providing 
oversight of an entire infrastructure sector to an SSSC working on behalf of the state 
infrastructure assurance program. The director of the SSSC would function like the 
section leader of an orchestra, by organizing the associated infrastructure sector to 
perform at the direction of the state infrastructure protection maestro. 
G. CREATE TRUST THROUGH INFORMATION SHARING 
Accurate intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical level is necessary 
for infrastructure protection practitioners to develop appropriate security programs to 
mitigate potential threats. Information sharing issues in the homeland security 
environment are generally oriented around concerns about the federal government’s 
sharing intelligence and threat information with state government, with the private sector 
or across any combination of those supposed partners. The fact that many private-sector 
asset owners do not get actionable intelligence leads them to conclude that government is 
unwilling to share relevant intelligence with them, rather than understanding that they are 
not getting the intelligence they expect because there that type of intelligence is not 
available. State government needs to develop trusting relationships, in which its private-
sector partners accept that, when the state has actionable intelligence of a direct and 
predictable threat to their industry, they will be apprised of the information. 
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In addition to intelligence information, more generalized information sharing is a 
necessary practice to achieve infrastructure protection and the assured delivery of service. 
For example, a public-private infrastructure assurance partnership should regularly share 
ideas on how to most effectively work together to achieve common understanding.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
There is an extensive array of infrastructure in this country that presents a 
potential target for terrorists. Identifying the infrastructure, quantifying what is critical, as 
well as understanding the interdependencies and vulnerabilities of that infrastructure to 
damage, and then developing effective mechanisms to protect that critical infrastructure 
and key resources (CIKR) is a daunting task. The federal government has identified the 
importance of critical infrastructure to the nation’s continued welfare and prosperity. It 
has created a number of strategies and plans to coordinate the protection of the nation’s 
CIKR. The federal government understands that the task of identifying and securing the 
nation’s CIKR is Herculean. It wisely acknowledges that it cannot protect all of the CIKR 
in the country. The federal solution to the CIKR protection task is to categorize and rank 
critical infrastructure by its relative importance to the country and to focus federal efforts 
to assess and develop plans to secure the assets with the highest national importance. 
The federal critical infrastructure strategies rely on assistance from state 
governments to support the federal effort to identify and secure assets that are most 
critical. The state of Massachusetts accepts responsibility to protect CIKR assets within 
the state that are designated as critically important by both the federal government and 
the state. The state of Massachusetts has signed on to a complex responsibility. 
There is no critical infrastructure protection (CIP) strategy for Massachusetts to 
guide the endeavor. Federal critical infrastructure protection strategies do not specify how 
states will protect the infrastructure in their jurisdiction. The state of Massachusetts lacks 
formal guidance that establishes a critical infrastructure protection program. The state 
also lacks formal guidance that identifies a vision, goals, objectives, and delineation of 
the responsibility for the effort required to identify, assess, and secure critical 
infrastructure in the state. The problem to be studied in this thesis is how to create a state 
government critical infrastructure protection program that effectively supports the 
national and state critical infrastructure protection needs. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. What should the roles and responsibilities of state government be with 
respect to assessing and protecting critical infrastructure assets in their 
jurisdiction? 
2. What could constitute an effective CIKR protection program for the state 
of Massachusetts?  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A significant amount of literature relative to critical infrastructure protection 
exists. Some of this literature identifies roles for state government in the country’s 
infrastructure protection mission. Two of the more current federal strategies, the 2009 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the May 2011, National Security Strategy 
identify state government as a significant partner in the CIP mission. That literature 
outlines the general concept of state government’s role in critical infrastructure 
protection. Unfortunately, it appears that the federal strategy is based on broad concepts 
and does not provide specific guidance that identifies how infrastructure will be protected 
and by whom. The intent of this research is to cull evidence from critical infrastructure 
protection literature that identifies the federal government’s expectations of a state 
government with respect to CIP, as well as to review literature capturing published 
lessons learned in the national CIP effort. Other critical infrastructure protection literature 
will be synthesized and evaluated to define an appropriate state government role to 
achieve an effective CIKR protection effort. The ultimate objective of this research is to 
provide a template that could assist the state of Massachusetts and other state 
governments to develop an effective CIP program with attainable objectives that also 
support the federal infrastructure protection objectives.  
Throughout this thesis, the analysis is influenced by this author’s opinion that in 
the arena of critical infrastructure protection governments are following the guidance of 
federal strategy without really understanding how to actually achieve the end states, why 
they are pursuing these efforts, and whether what they are pursuing will be effective. Dr. 
Christopher Bellavita articulates that sense well when he writes, “Homeland security’s 
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first decade was characterized by ‘ready, fire, aim.’ A great deal of work had to be done 
in a short period of time. Much was accomplished during that decade and it cost a lot of 
money.” He writes further, “No one knows how much of that money went to ineffective 
activities because the homeland security enterprise spent more effort firing than aiming.”1 
My objective is to identify where the CIP effort is well-aimed fire to be continued as 
“effective fire” and where the efforts that constitute firing without aiming should receive 
the order to “shift fire” or “cease fire.” 
For future efforts, this author recommends research into the appropriate level of 
government intervention required to protect or to regulate the protection of privately 
owned critical infrastructure assets that support our nation. Theoretically, free-market 
forces should establish the degree of protection necessary to secure infrastructure sectors 
that support a capitalist society. Presumably, the private sector understands what is 
required to secure the infrastructure it operates. To compound this issue, the degree of 
federal intervention required to secure a sector may vary across the different 
infrastructure sectors. An extension to this debate is whether the private sector should be 
allowed to own infrastructure that is critical to the welfare of our nation or whether that 
infrastructure should be owned by the government. Answering those questions is 
important and complex. Additionally, it is necessary to establish credible criteria and 
associated metrics that objectively measure the value of the state’s CIKR protection 
effort. In these times of reduced budget and financial constraints, the protection efforts 
undertaken must target the CIKR that is most vulnerable to damage and, if damaged, will 
present the greatest loss to the state and country. That CIKR may be a critical node that 
links multiple components of a sector together or links multiple interdependent sectors 
where damage to that node will propagate damage across the sector or sectors. Properly 
securing that CIKR asset should maximize the protection investment for the entire sector 
or sectors. 
                                                 
1 Bellavita, “How Proverbs Damage.” 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review that follows will identify the lack of definitive guidance as 
to what constitutes an effective CIP role for a state government. Much of the 
government-generated literature on CIP seems to perpetuate the same general concepts 
articulated in federal homeland security strategies, but it lacks detail on validated 
protection roles for state government. State government infrastructure protection 
strategies seem to parrot the language in federal guidance, seemingly to insure that they 
are competitive for federal infrastructure protection grant funds by impressing the grant 
application reviewers with their knowledge of federal CIKR guidance. What the literature 
review will show is the complexity of the CIKR protection issue, and it suggests that the 
limited understanding of the issue from the state infrastructure protection practitioner’s 
perspective interferes with developing relevant state CIP strategy. This review will also 
identify the lack of research to validate the government resources expended on critical 
infrastructure protection. Based on this information, this thesis will outline the scope of 
the CIKR protection issue from a state perspective, while identifying what we know, 
what we do not know, what we think we know, and what we need to know to establish an 
effective CIKR protection effort. 
The critical infrastructure that supports our nation’s economy and way of life is 
vast and complex. Not surprisingly, there is a relatively broad spectrum of literature 
related to critical infrastructure. However, there are no academic studies that identify 
what an effective critical infrastructure protection program for a state government should 
look like. In order to posit a viable role for state government in critical infrastructure 
protection, this author’s review focuses on literature with a nexus to protecting 
infrastructure. To meet the objectives of this thesis, the literature review investigates the 
following areas:  
• The definition of CIKR based upon the history of modern critical 
infrastructure;  
• Guidance relative to identifying and inventorying infrastructure;  
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• An assessment of CIKR vulnerability to damage from natural or man-
made events;  
• The securing of networks that support critical infrastructure; and 
• Information sharing with federal and private-sector partners. 
Much of the available critical infrastructure protection guidance is found in 
federal government homeland security strategies, Department of Defense (DoD) 
directives, Congressional testimony and research, state government homeland security 
strategies, and academic research, journals, and textbooks. These sources are reviewed in 
the following sections.  
1. Federal Government Homeland Security Guidance 
A series of presidential directives—from EO 13010 in 1996 to Presidential 
Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) in 1998, signed by President Clinton, to Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), signed by President Bush in 2003—
demonstrate the evolution in federal thinking about the CIKR issue. The release of EO 
13010 was a benchmark indicator that critical infrastructure protection was on the federal 
government’s radar. EO 13010 created the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection to study the issue and develop understanding in order to make 
recommendations for action. Members of the commission were to be nominated by the 
heads of executive branches of the federal government. The commission came to be 
known as the Marsh Commission, named for the chairman, General Robert T. Marsh, 
USAF (Retired). The fact that the commission chairman was a retired military officer 
may be an indication that President Clinton viewed the CIP challenge as the domain of 
the Department of Defense. EO 13010 identifies eight sectors of infrastructure that the 
federal government believed, at that time, to be the important critical infrastructure with 
“vital” importance to the nation’s security.2 Since that time the number of CIKR sectors 
has grown to its current list of eighteen sectors, which will be identified later in this 
thesis. 
                                                 
2 Executive Order 13010. 
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Federal homeland security strategies demonstrate a similar evolution as well. The 
series of federal homeland security strategies released in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, affords insight into the government’s understanding of the 
world of infrastructure protection at that time and reflects the nation’s focus on the threat 
to infrastructure from terrorism. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, released in 2003, was an initial attempt to 
coordinate the disparate infrastructure protection efforts being undertaken across the 
country. Because there were numerous federal strategies referencing the critical 
infrastructure protection effort, like the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was 
created to be the source document on CIP programs nationwide.3 The 2006 NIPP and the 
updated 2009 NIPP represent the more recent history and evolution of critical 
infrastructure protection. The 2009 NIPP is a comprehensive document that provides 
solid foundational guidance for any infrastructure program. However, the 
comprehensiveness of the 2009 NIPP translates into a document that may go unread by 
many in homeland security due to its length.  
The 2009 NIPP expanded upon The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
released in October 2007, which, at the time, provided the overarching federal guidance 
for protecting the homeland. The 2007 National Strategy specifically addresses critical 
infrastructure protection and broadly identified objectives, such as deterrence of the 
terrorist threat, mitigating asset vulnerabilities, and minimizing consequences as means of 
protecting our nation’s infrastructure.4  
The National Security Strategy released in May 2010 provides the latest federal 
vision for securing our nation. In that strategy, President Obama addresses resilience as 
the integral element to CIKR assurance achieved through a number of actions to include 
modernizing and upgrading CIKR.5 The current National Strategy also identifies 
improving intelligence capacity and information sharing as important elements to CIKR 
                                                 
3 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006. 
4 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007. 
5 National Security Strategy, 2010. 
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assurance. Like many federal strategies the latest National Security Strategy is full of fine 
rhetoric and good intentions. Whether as a nation we can claim to have turned those 
strategic words into action and results remains to be seen.  
As alluded to earlier, the Department of Defense (DoD) has had experience with 
security and protection of infrastructure, including infrastructure throughout our nation. 
Well before 1996, the DoD had been involved in identifying the vulnerabilities of an 
adversary’s infrastructure to disruption from an attack, and it is involved in securing 
infrastructure that supports our nation’s military operations. As such, there is DoD 
guidance available that identifies the programs that the military utilizes to secure CIKR. 
DoD guidance could be replicated by a state government as the basis for that entity’s 
infrastructure protection program. 
2. Department of Defense Directives 
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), the DoD is 
assigned as the federal agency responsible for the defense industrial base (DIB).6 In 
federal homeland security strategies the DIB is identified as one of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure sectors. In addition to defending the United States, the DoD is responsible 
for ensuring the security of the DIB. An interesting document pertaining to the military’s 
role in our nation’s critical infrastructure protection is Department of Defense Directive 
(DODD) 3020.40, “Defense Critical Infrastructure Program.” The directive establishes 
that,  
Defense Critical Infrastructure, which includes DOD and non-DOD 
domestic and foreign infrastructures essential to planning, mobilizing, 
deploying, executing, and sustaining U.S. military operations on a global 
basis, shall be available when required. Coordination on remediation 
and/or mitigation shall be accomplished with other Federal Agencies, 
State and local governments, the private sector, and equivalent foreign 
entities, as appropriate.7  
                                                 
6 White House, HSPD-7. 
7 Department of Defense Directive 3020.40.  
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Both HSPD-7 and DODD 3020.40 provide a broad overview relative to DoD’s 
responsibility for the security of the DIB, but they do not provide specific information 
about how protection of that infrastructure sector will be achieved. Although DoD 
guidance does not specify the role of state government in protecting DIB infrastructure 
located within a given state’s jurisdiction, a state may wish to replicate the DoD’s 
infrastructure protection efforts. State government must also understand the DoD’s 
reliance upon the states and the private sector to help it secure the DIB. Paul Stockton 
affirms the DoD’s historical relationship with state governments with respect to defense 
support to civil authorities and suggests that the DoD must strongly rely on state 
government and the private sector to assist in securing CIKR and to assure the delivery of 
services to the DIB.8 Stockton’s view highlights the need and the value of a partnership 
among the DoD, state government, and the private sector. 
3. Congressional Research and Testimony 
Reports of congressional testimony are a wellspring of information that provides 
insight to the critical infrastructure protection issue. The testimony of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Director, John Deutch, highlights the threat to our nation that drove 
protection-related responses. The results of a congressionally mandated investigation 
captured in the Downing Report establish for the president and Congress the nature of 
terrorist threats facing the Department of Defense and identify measures to mitigate those 
threats.9 Reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) based on 
congressional hearing testimony given by leaders from the private sector, such as the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance Cyber Security, 
offer specific examples of where infrastructure is vulnerable and offer recommendations 
to mitigate those vulnerabilities.10 Also, research conducted on behalf of Congress by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides great insight into CIKR issues debated 
before Congress. For example, the 2007 CRS Report for Congress, The Department of 
                                                 
8 Stockton, “Ten Years After.” 
9 “Report to the President and Congress.” 
10 GAO, “Testimony before the House Committee.” 
 9
Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for 
Congress identifies the importance of accurately assessing risk to CIKR.11 The CRS 
report also addresses the challenges to the awarding of homeland security grant funds 
based on risk assessment formulas. With respect to a CIP program, a proper risk 
management assessment strategy is integral to its success. However, the debate suggests 
that communities utilized inappropriate risk analysis formulas and inflated their 
community’s risk in order to compete for more federal funds. Accurately calculating risk 
is necessary for government to effectively target funding where it will best secure the 
nation’s infrastructure and not simply satiate a politician’s appetite for “political pork.” 
The challenges surrounding risk analysis will be addressed more thoroughly later in this 
thesis. 
4. State Government Homeland Security Strategies 
Many states in the nation have written homeland security strategies for their 
jurisdiction. Arizona was one of the first states to develop a stand-alone infrastructure 
protection plan. The states of Washington and Virginia have followed and developed 
infrastructure protection strategies too. Each of these documents provides insight toward 
how that state intends to secure its people and commerce. In Chapter V this thesis will 
review those states’ CIP strategies to evaluate areas of consensus and divergence with 
respect to the roles that a state government undertakes in CIP. Also, an analysis of those 
state CIP strategies reveals where they are synchronized with the guidance recommended 
in the NIPP. It is not clear whether the state strategies simply parroted the NIPP’s 
guidance to demonstrate the state’s support of the NIPP in an effort to compete for 
federal grant funds.  
Unlike Arizona, Virginia, and Washington, Massachusetts does not have a critical 
infrastructure strategy. Massachusetts has disseminated the State Homeland Security 
Strategy, September 2007, which very generally acknowledges the need for a critical 
infrastructure program but provides no more guidance as to how that CIP program will be 
                                                 
11 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, “Risk Assessment Methodology.” 
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structured.12 For that deficiency alone, any of the three state CIP strategies identified 
above could be used as a benchmark strategy for Massachusetts to emulate. The analysis 
of those state CIP strategies and the NIPP, in conjunction with information gleaned from 
academic research, journals, and textbooks, will provide the foundation for the CIP 
strategic actions to be recommended for Massachusetts later in this thesis. 
5. Academic Research, Journals, and Textbooks 
There is a significant amount of information regarding critical infrastructure 
captured in academic journals and textbooks. Filtering the literature that is most relevant 
to my topic poses a challenge. However, a textbook written by Dr. Ted Lewis elucidates 
some of the complexity of infrastructure protection and should be an important tool to 
help identify the role of state or local government in infrastructure protection. Dr. 
Lewis’s work, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security, explains the early 
history of critical infrastructure and delves into the complexity of networks and the 
interdependencies that networks create.13 Another relevant text providing important and 
broad insight into the CIP issue is Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response. The writings of 
many of the contributors to the Marsh Commission, as compiled in this book, are an 
important reference for anyone involved in critical infrastructure protection or for those 
studying critical infrastructure. The chapter by Brian Lopez, titled “Critical Infrastructure 
Protection in the United States Since 1993,” provides comprehensive insight into the 
recent history of critical infrastructure.14  
Another important academic contributor to CIP research exists at George Mason 
University (GMU) School of Law, Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland 
Security. The CIP research program is strongly influenced by the findings of the Marsh 
Commission. The GMU research program was developed with Congressional funding, 
the results of which have produced numerous research papers making significant 
contributions to the field of CIP. One such study referenced later in this thesis is Critical 
                                                 
12 Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Homeland Security Strategy. 
13 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
14 Lopez, “Critical Infrastructure Protection.” 
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Path: A Brief History of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States.15 This 
work provides a more extended history of critical infrastructure than will be addressed in 
this thesis. The GMU CIKR research and commensurate writings should be considered a 
great resource for professional CIP practitioners.  
The history of critical infrastructure just begins to demonstrate the complexity of 
the CIKR protection challenge. The complex challenge may further be evidenced in areas 
such as CIKR risk analysis, the fact that CIKR supports communities across the nation 
and across jurisdictional boundaries, and the apparent depth of competing economic 
interests across government jurisdictions and private industry with respect to CIP. This 
complex challenge calls for the development of strategies to manage the problem. There 
is ample textbook material relative to developing strategy and whether strategy has value 
and provides a means to an end. John Bryson provides insightful suggestions to guide 
government and nonprofit strategy sessions in his book Strategic Planning for Public and 
Nonprofit Organizations.16 Also, the value of a strategic initiative is captured in the book 
Megacommunities. The concept of “megacommunities” was developed by consultants 
from Booz Allen Hamilton to describe multifunctional partnerships leveraging their 
cumulative knowledge to solve complex problems.17 The megacommunity concept will 
strongly influence the conclusion of this thesis. 
6. Summary of Literature Review 
The above-mentioned literature reflects what the government and the CIP 
practitioner knows, thinks they know, and through inference what they need to know 
about a state government’s role in CIKR protection. Throughout the federal government 
guidance, broad statements, and platitudes are abundant concerning the role of 
government in CIP. The guidance lacks metrics that demonstrate that the recommended 
solutions produce an effective and necessary level of protection. The DoD literature 
represents the military’s efforts in CIP, which can enlighten a state government CIP 
                                                 
15 Brown, Critical Path. 
16 Bryson, Strategic Planning. 
17 Gerencser et al., Megacommunities. 
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practitioner but lacks specific, validated recommendations that will achieve a measured 
degree of CIKR protection. Congressional testimony and research are also deficient in 
identifying specific roles that state government can undertake to achieve measurable 
protection results. The state government homeland security strategies lack specific 
solutions and guidance that will establish an effective CIP program based on measured 
success. The academic research and studies conducted on the CIP issues begin to 
establish what an effective CIP program might look like, but they still lack validation. 
This thesis will evaluate what is known, challenge what is believed to be known, and 
suggest that the current knowledge is lacking in defining specific actions that are proven 
to have value, with demonstrable CIKR protection results. The thesis will make the case 
that in-depth research is needed to establish effective actions for incorporation into a state 
CIP strategy.  
E. METHOD 
In order to more fully capture the state of knowledge relative to state 
government’s role in CIKR protection, a more thorough and systematic literature analysis 
will be conducted to qualitatively identify what critical infrastructure protection is, what 
roles a state government plays in critical infrastructure protection, what specific actions 
posture a state to achieve effective critical infrastructure protection, and what are best 
practices in the field of critical infrastructure protection. Also, a qualitative analysis of 
relevant CIKR strategies will be conducted to identify whether there are established 
metrics that validate or disconfirm actions undertaken by state government to provide an 
effective and appropriate protection posture. The structured analysis of the literature 
should establish what we know, what we do not know, and what we need to know to 
ensure that a state government CIKR protection effort provides an effective protection 
posture.  
The literature selection criteria will initially target literature that defines critical 
infrastructure and the federal government’s general role in CIP. The selection criteria will 
be further guided by the six broad categories of state government CIKR protection 
actions recommended by the federal government in its 2009 NIPP. The six categories of 
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action for federal and state governments as described in the NIPP risk management 
framework are to: “set goals and objectives; identify assets, systems, and networks; 
assess risks; prioritize CIKR across sectors; implement protective programs and 
resiliency strategies; and measure the effectiveness of risk-mitigation efforts.”18 
Literature that addresses state government’s role in achieving each of those six NIPP 
objectives will be qualitatively assessed to determine whether an effective means of 
achieving those six objectives exists. A qualitative assessment should also determine 
what we do not know and what we need to know in the field of infrastructure protection. 
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II. WHAT WE KNOW: AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE CRITICALITY 
An important aspect of CIKR protection is that the CIP practitioner knosw what 
makes infrastructure critical. This chapter will review four historical events that provide 
context as to how infrastructure becomes critical and insight as to when infrastructure is 
critical. As suggested in an edition of the Heritage Foundation’s Backgrounder, titled 
How to Fix Critical Infrastructure Protection Plans: A Guide for Congress, the use of 
“critical” as an infrastructure qualifier has undermined the nation’s efforts to protect 
infrastructure that is truly critical.19 These historical cases will begin to focus the analysis 
of infrastructure criticality and expose the undercurrent driving CIKR protection 
concerns. 
A. CRITICALITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEFINED BY EXAMPLE 
Defining the term “critical infrastructure” is necessary to establish the foundation 
for understanding the issue of critical infrastructure protection. Unfortunately there is no 
single definition for “critical infrastructure” that clearly frames the boundaries of what 
constitutes critical infrastructure. Absent a single definition of critical infrastructure, a 
general understanding of the history of critical infrastructure in this country may help one 
comprehend when infrastructure becomes critical and establish a framework to better 
comprehend the Gordian knot facing jurisdictions responsible for protecting CIKR. A 
review of four incidents since 1962, involving elements of infrastructure, will 
demonstrate how infrastructure is critical. The historical review will also highlight the 
ever-changing nature of infrastructure and the increasing complexity of infrastructure 
sectors over a relatively brief period of time. The reality of the ever-growing complexity 
of infrastructure and the potential threats to it will demonstrate the need for the state CIP 
practitioner to be invested in remaining well read and current in the dynamic world of 
infrastructure protection. 
                                                 
19 McNeil and Weitz, ”How to Fix.” 
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1. The Telephone System 
According to Dr. Ted Lewis, the specific phrase “critical infrastructure 
protection” was not used in print until 1997. However, as Dr. Lewis explains in his book 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security, the evolution of infrastructure 
protection began with the need to ensure a more secure telephone system after phone 
communications between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev were disrupted 30 
years earlier during the Cuban Missile Crisis.20 The telephone system during that crisis 
reportedly did not provide reliable service during the tense negotiations between the two 
world leaders or between Kennedy’s National Security Counsel and Defense Department 
leaders. Certainly, a poor communication system serving as the primary means of 
communication between world leaders at the brink of nuclear war would qualify as a 
“critical” system. This event may serve as a starting point to depict how a public service 
system achieves “critical infrastructure” status.  
At a more pedestrian level, most people in the United States have experienced the 
challenge to fulfilling their daily lives when their telephone service or cell phone service 
is disrupted as the result of the ravages of Mother Nature. At these times it is easy to 
appreciate the convenience of the telephone system. The widespread loss of a public 
service like the telephone system is, in the early stage, an inconvenience. A more 
prolonged outage quickly expands from an inconvenience to an economic loss. When 
disrupted, public service systems such as the water supply system or the electric grid are 
also more easily appreciated as infrastructure that is critical to support a society. These 
systems are vulnerable to the ravages of Mother Nature or the sinister actions of man. 
Under circumstances like natural disaster, the CIP practitioner may recommend that 
public resilience and self-reliance for the physically and mentally able over a short period 
of time is a necessary element of the state infrastructure protection strategy to free 
government to focus on the relatively few who cannot fend for themselves, like the 
elderly and the handicapped. 
                                                 
20 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 29. 
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2. Desert Storm as a Harbinger of a Nation’s Infrastructure 
Vulnerability 
An event in 1991, almost three decades after the Cuban Missile Crisis, provides a 
vastly different perspective to appreciate how infrastructure becomes critical to a modern 
society’s stability. To those who watched, the result of the U.S.-led coalition air attack on 
Iraq’s infrastructure during Operation DESERT STORM effectively demonstrated how 
profoundly a modern country’s national infrastructure supports its “center of gravity” and 
is vulnerable to fatal disruption.21 According to a 1997 GAO report evaluating the 
effectiveness of the Desert Storm air campaign, the U.S. Central Command’s Air 
Component Commander’s operations order identified that the strategic air campaign 
would be initiated to attack, among other targets, Iraq’s “command and control systems; 
Republican Guard forces; telecommunications facilities; and key elements of national 
infrastructure, such as critical LOCs [i.e., lines of communication], electric grid, 
petroleum storage, and military production facilities.”22 A barometer of the strategic 
effectiveness of the air campaign may lie in the fact that the ground war met its objectives 
within 100 hours. The strategic success of Operation DESERT STORM is attributed to 
the air attacks on Iraq’s national infrastructure that supported the national government, 
military leadership, and defense industrial base. Once Iraq’s centers of gravity were 
fatally disrupted, its ability to secure its sovereignty was severely taxed. 
The disruption of those national infrastructure assets crippled Iraq’s formerly 
formidable war machine. During Desert Storm, the ability of the United States military 
and coalition forces to completely undermine Iraq’s military power by disrupting its 
infrastructure might be seen as a harbinger of our country’s own dependence on modern 
infrastructure and the potential vulnerabilities of our nation’s centers of gravity. The air 
campaign’s success during Desert Storm was a public testimonial for all to see that 
                                                 
21 “Center of gravity,” in this context, is a military reference to a component or capability of an enemy 
that is integral to the enemy’s strength to such a degree that, by destroying the component or significantly 
reducing the effectiveness of the capability, the enemy’s ability to project offensive power or to defend 
itself against attack is vastly diminished.  
22 Operation Desert Storm. 
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modern infrastructure, which similarly supports most of the world’s developed countries, 
creates a significant vulnerability to a nation’s well-being. 
The pace at which the federal government has been pursuing infrastructure 
protection over the past fifteen or more years seems to correlate with a concern for the 
vulnerability of the nation to a sustained military attack. 
3. The Northeast Blackout Highlights the Vulnerable Power Grid 
On August 14, 2003, a relatively innocuous event—as compared to Operation 
DESERT STORM—occurred. The event, however, highlighted the frailties of a modern 
power infrastructure system. That event, now referred to as the Northeast Blackout of 
2003, caused the loss of electric power to parts of the northeastern and midwestern 
United States, as well as the province of Ontario, Canada. The widespread power 
blackout resulted from a power surge that stressed an Ohio power station. That surge was 
greatly compounded when low-hanging tree limbs shorted power lines on the Ohio 
electric grid. The combination of a short circuit during a power surge resulted in 
cascading disruptions throughout the interconnected power grid servicing the United 
States and Canada. A series of events linked to this outage would have remained isolated 
had procedures and safeguards designed to avoid power outages of this magnitude 
functioned effectively.23 
This power outage is a vivid example of how a networked infrastructure is 
potentially vulnerable to an event triggered by man or nature. Today, regional power 
grids are now connected and reliant upon one another to share electricity during peaks 
and troughs of electric need. The power systems rely upon supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) technology to achieve the appropriate flow of power to meet 
demand across the grid. The system conserves electricity through its efficiency, but it 
also creates the potential for widespread failure. Our aging electric grid controlled by  
 
 
                                                 
23 Minkel, “2003 Northeast Blackout.” 
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SCADA systems that are vulnerable to computer malfunctions, combined with our 
nation’s increased power consumption and commensurate power demand, appear to be a 
recipe for large-scale collapse. 
As many infrastructure sectors develop more efficient delivery of goods or service 
through technological improvements, the infrastructure systems ineluctably become more 
complex. The system’s complexities further multiply as infrastructure sectors become 
more dependent on other complex CIKR systems to function. Understanding these 
systems and their interdependencies is a prerequisite for state and local governments to 
effectively secure the assets and the systems they support.  
4. Hurricane Katrina, Establishing the Limits of Vulnerability 
Hurricane Katrina at many levels was an epic catastrophe. This single event 
certainly altered the federal government’s course in managing recovery from a large-
scale emergency. Katrina also exposed how Mother Nature can ravage our quality of life 
by eliminating our infrastructure systems. In many respects the destructive impact of 
Hurricane Katrina exceeded, by far, that of a nuclear bomb. Consider, for example, the 
swath of destruction created in the path of Katrina, beginning in Florida and extending 
across Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi—an area almost 93,000 square miles.24 
Destruction within that swath included over 1,300 deaths, with total damage estimates 
close to $100 billion. Nearly 300,000 residences were destroyed.25 Within that swath of 
damage, 2.5 million electric-company customers reported power outages, and broadcast 
communications outages were realized by 50 percent of the radio stations and 44 percent 
of the television stations.26 The extent and duration of these infrastructure disruptions 
greatly impacted the entire nation. 
Although a natural disaster of this magnitude is relatively rare, Katrina clearly 
demonstrates the regional and national impact that the loss of service and support 
provided by infrastructure can mean. When considering the term infrastructure 
                                                 
24 Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 1. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
26 Ibid., 8. 
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protection, there appears to be very little that man can do to protect infrastructure against 
this degree of wrath from Mother Nature. Yet, protection may be a misnomer, conveying 
an unrealistic expectation on the part of local, state, and federal security and emergency 
management practitioners. As futile as it may seem to protect against the extreme forces 
of nature, it is precisely this worst-case scenario whose effects we must prepare to 
mitigate. 
As was indicated previously in the example of the Northeast Blackout, 
interdependencies within infrastructure sectors and across infrastructure sectors create 
potential vulnerabilities within our nation’s infrastructure. Understanding those 
interdependencies is necessary to mitigating the effects of severe natural or man-made 
forces. An interesting example of this reality is shared in the Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: “Federal, State and local officials responded to Hurricane Katrina 
without a comprehensive understanding of the interdependencies of the critical 
infrastructure sectors in each geographic area and the potential second and third order 
effects of their decisions. For example, an energy company arranged to have generators 
shipped to facilities where they were needed to restore the flow of oil to the entire mid-
Atlantic United States. However, FEMA regional representatives diverted these 
generators to hospitals.”27 Without understanding the breadth and depth of an 
infrastructure sector, officials may make decisions that unnecessarily extend the impact 
of an event beyond the immediate area originally impacted. 
The degree of destruction from Hurricane Katrina is thankfully a rare occurrence 
in this country. The degree of infrastructure loss in this example easily defines 
infrastructure that has achieved the status of “critical.” Using this event and the others as 
examples to define how or when infrastructure becomes critical may convey that 
infrastructure is only critical when it is threatened under extreme events and when it lacks 
resiliency. That will be a point for consideration. 
The four historical cases reviewed above demonstrate our society’s reliance upon 
infrastructure such as the telephone system; the exponential growth in complexity of 
                                                 
27 Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 61. 
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CIKR since the Cuban Missile Crisis; the threat to disruption of CIKR due to man-made 
events like military attack, as in the case of Desert Storm, or from design vulnerabilities 
and less than optimal maintenance, as exemplified in the Northeast Blackout; and the 
manner in which an extreme disaster challenges a nation’s ability to maintain its people’s 
way of life. In these examples certain infrastructure achieves critical status, but not all 
infrastructures are critical. Further analysis is necessary to assist a CIP practitioner to 
understand when infrastructure is critical and what can be done to mitigate the threat to 
our way of life through the loss of critical infrastructure. The analysis of federal 
government strategies that follows will help to further establish the federal government’s 
parameters for infrastructure criticality and the role of state government in protecting it. 
B. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY DEFINING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ROLES 
The evolution of federal guidance relative to the definition of critical 
infrastructure protection is reviewed next. The following section provides examples of 
how different federal strategies offer varying definitions of critical infrastructure. An 
analysis of those strategies demonstrates that specific examples are not given as to which 
type of CIKR asset is considered critical and which asset is not considered critical. 
Federal guidance should provide specific examples of critical assets from each 
infrastructure sector to establish a guideline for CIP practitioners to use when 
determining whether an infrastructure asset achieves critical status. The overuse of 
criticality as an infrastructure qualifier stems from policymakers’ discomfort at 
acknowledging that all infrastructures cannot be protected: the default is to call 
everything critical and treat it alike. The issue is explained well in an edition of the 
Backgrounder:  
Essentially, there is an incentive to deem infrastructure critical because of 
the resources that become available from such a designation. This is an 
inherent flaw in the NIPP, a framework which centers its approach on 
what it perceives as critical. Addressing this challenge will require a 
shared effort between the private sector and the federal government, as 
well as hard choices, to disaggregate what is “critical” (essential for 
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sustaining and supporting Americans’ daily lives) from what is 
“dangerous” (e.g., chemical facilities) but not necessarily critical.28 
Without specific criteria for what is critical, including an explanation of how and 
why an asset is believed to be critical, CIP practitioners may be influenced to label an 
asset as critical solely to receive federal grant funds to enhance the protection of that 
asset. We will review different federal strategies that provide ambiguous definitions of 
infrastructure criticality. 
According to a Congressional Research Service report for Congress, a 1983 
Congressional Budget Office report qualifies infrastructure as that which is “directly 
critical to the nation’s economy.” The report further lists examples of infrastructure, 
including “highways, public transit systems, wastewater treatment works, water 
resources, air traffic control, airports and municipal water supply.”29 By 1996, 
government interest and its developing understanding of the complexity of critical 
infrastructure protection is evident in the evolving descriptions of critical infrastructure. 
In that year, the opening sentence of E.O. 13010, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” 
describes critical infrastructure as being “so vital that their incapacity or destruction 
would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United 
States.”30 The executive order listed telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas 
and oil storage, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency 
services, and continuity of government as inclusive of critical infrastructure. The 
executive order also broadly identified the threats to infrastructure as falling into two 
categories: either “physical threats” or “cyber threats.”31 That description of critical 
infrastructure is certainly subject to individual interpretation as to what “vital” means and 
what constitutes “a debilitating impact.” How, then, should a state or local government  
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interpret the federal guidance in order to protect appropriate infrastructure in its 
jurisdiction? Analysis of successive federal strategies will demonstrate the evolving 
federal definition of “critical” infrastructure. 
Within two years, the Presidential Decision Directive 63 described critical 
infrastructure as “those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum 
operations of the economy and government.”32 The obvious focus of PDD 63 was 
directed to the “cyber-based” vulnerability of critical infrastructure:  
Many of the nation’s critical infrastructures have historically been 
physically and logically separate systems that had little interdependence. 
As a result of advances in information technology and the necessity of 
improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become 
increasingly automated and interlinked.33 
In two short years, our national leaders were learning just how interdependent our 
infrastructure systems had become and, subsequently, how apparently frail the 
infrastructure was due to cyber threats. As our national leaders expanded the parameters 
of what constitutes critical infrastructure and its potential vulnerabilities, state 
governments remained challenged to understand their role in protecting those assets. 
The USA Patriot Act, written in the shadow of the 9/11 terror attacks, describes 
critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) as “systems and assets, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems 
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health, or any combination of those matters.”34 This broad definition, 
inclusive of many entities and assets, only expands the spectrum of assets that may 
achieve critical status. Without specific examples of critical assets, state government 
remains challenged to gauge which infrastructure is actually critical. 
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Within two years, the release of the National Strategy for the Physical Protection 
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, in February 2003, identified the critical 
infrastructure protection issue, explaining,  
The facilities, systems, and functions that comprise our critical 
infrastructures are highly sophisticated and complex. They include human 
assets and physical and cyber systems that work together in processes that 
are highly independent. They also consist of key nodes that, in turn, are 
essential to the operation of the critical infrastructures in which they 
function.35 
This strategy acknowledges the expanding complexity of CIKR, the 
interdependencies and the breadth of assets that make up CIKR, and it expands the 
description of critical infrastructure to include human assets and cyber systems while 
publicly acknowledging the existence of “key nodes.” Yet, again, federal guidance only 
expands the number of assets potentially falling into the spectrum of critical 
infrastructure. Interestingly, the strategy remains focused on the threat to CIKR from 
terrorism. Of course these strategies were written with the attacks of 9/11 relatively fresh 
in people’s minds and still years before the impact of Hurricane Katrina altered the 
federal strategic view of CIKR. 
The 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) represents a significant 
evolution from the government’s view of infrastructure evident in the 1980s. The 2009 
edition of the NIPP demonstrates a refined federal government understanding of the 
CIKR protection issue. However, in the glossary of key terms of the 2009 NIPP, the 
definition of critical infrastructure remains consistent, almost to the word, to that in the 
Patriot Act.36 In the body of the 2009 NIPP, CIKR is broadly qualified:  
Attacks on CIKR could significantly disrupt the functioning of 
government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond 
the targeted sector and physical location of the incident. Direct terrorist 
attacks and natural, manmade, or technological hazards could produce  
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catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and 
economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and 
confidence.37  
Based on this description, one can infer what assets meet those qualifications. 
There remains a need for a more definitive description, with examples, of what 
constitutes CIKR. 
Solid research is needed to support the criterion that defines the criticality of 
infrastructure. Eliminating ambiguity as to what is critical will minimize the CIP 
practitioner’s burden of validating what is or is not a critical asset to a politician looking 
to spread some “pork.” In the absence of specific criteria to designate CIKR as critical, a 
state CIP practitioner should search for and read as much research material on this subject 
as is possible in order to develop a learned opinion of what infrastructure is truly critical. 
Having reviewed the issue surrounding the definition of what is critical, we will 
begin the analysis of state government’s role in CIKR protection. The NIPP suggests that, 
in order to protect CIKR across the nation, establishing partnerships between federal 
government, state government, and the private sector is important. In order to be a good 
partner, one must know who his partners are, their capabilities, and their motivations. In 
that light, the next chapter will examine the roles performed by two of the significant 
federal partners with which state governments will interact with to protect CIKR: the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. 
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III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S STAKE 
The federal government has assumed responsibility for protecting CIKR 
throughout the nation. That is a broad mandate that is shared by numerous federal 
agencies, as identified in Figure 1. Of the federal agencies listed in Figure 1, state 
government infrastructure protection practitioners will predominantly interact directly 
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense 
(DoD). The state government infrastructure protection practitioner, as a partner in the 
CIKR protection effort, should understand their partners’ infrastructure protection 
mandate. The state should also understand each of their federal partners’ CIP roles in 
order to more effectively support the federal effort, to coordinate state and local 
protection efforts, to avoid duplicating efforts with the federal government, and to gauge 
which protection efforts may not be covered in their state by the federal government. In 
the event that the federal government is deficient in fulfilling its CIP role in a given state, 
that state may elect to fill the federal void and assume the federal CIP responsibility. A 
state’s election to fill a void will certainly impact the composition of that state’s CIP 
program.  
This chapter provides an overview of the CIP roles of the DoD and the DHS. 
Background information about both federal departments’ CIKR protection mandate will 
also provide basic insight into federal CIP expectations for the state government. This 
author rationalized the state’s need to understand the federal roles based upon a concept 
in military planning: in order to achieve proper coordination and unity of effort, entities 
tasked within a plan or strategy should know the roles and responsibilities of the tasked 
and supporting units at echelons above and below them. Similarly, in the national CIP 
effort, each of the entities tasked to protect CIKR should know its partners’ tasked roles 
and capabilities.  
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A. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
The Department of Homeland Security was established under the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002. The creation of the DHS consolidated numerous disparate federal 
agencies under the control of the Secretary of Homeland Security. By virtue of the new 
department’s broad homeland security mission, the Secretary of Homeland Security was 
also tasked to be the single individual responsible to coordinate the federal government’s 
CIKR protection effort. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) issued 
December 17, 2003, establishes the mandate of the Secretary of Homeland Security with 
respect to CIKR protection. As stipulated in HSPD-7:  
In carrying out the functions assigned in the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, the Secretary shall be responsible for coordinating the overall 
national effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and 
key resources of the United States. The Secretary shall serve as the 
principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation 
of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local 
governments, and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and 
key resources. Consistent with this directive, the Secretary will identify, 
prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key 
resources with an emphasis on critical infrastructure and key resources 
that could be exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or mass 
casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass 
destruction.38  
The above guidance outlines the broad responsibilities of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. In order to discharge those duties, the Department of Homeland 
Security created directorates with commensurate tasks to execute the duties assigned to 
the secretary. One of those DHS directorates is the National Programs and Protection 
Directorate. Assigned within the National Programs and Protection Directorate is the 
Office of Infrastructure Protection, which bears the primary responsibility to carryout the 
Department of Homeland Security’s CIKR protection mission.  
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1. Office of Infrastructure Protection 
Within the Office of the Under-Secretary for National Protection and Programs is 
the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), which is designated as the lead within the 
Department of Homeland Security to coordinate the national effort to protect critical 
infrastructure. According to the DHS website, the NIPP is the guiding document for the 
IP. The Office of Infrastructure Protection is comprised of the following seven divisions:  
• Contingency Planning and Incident Management Division (CPIMD); 
• Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division (IASD); 
• Infrastructure Information Collection Division (IICD); 
• Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD); 
• Partnership and Outreach Division (POD); 
• Protective Security Coordination Division (PSCD); and 
• Sector Specific Agency Executive Management Office (SSA EMO). 
Of the divisions within the Office of Infrastructure Protection, the Protective 
Security Coordination Division is one that the state or local infrastructure protection 
entities will regularly interact with. Each state has at least one protective security advisor 
(PSA) who is assigned to the PSCD as a liaison to a given state. The PSA should provide 
the conduit between the state or local government entity and DHS for federal guidance 
and resources with respect to CIKR protection.  
Independent of a PSA, the state CIP practitioner should establish working 
relationships with DHS representatives in each of these seven divisions in order to 
receive additional federal support and guidance. Justification for a state CIP practitioner 
to develop secondary relationships within the seven divisions is evidenced in a 2010 
GAO report. That report questions the effectiveness of the PSA program to disseminate 
recent IP guidance to state governments and the private sector with respect to developing 
resilient capacity, the core principle espoused in the 2009 NIPP.39 That diminished 
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capacity brings into question the effectiveness of the PSAs in other CIKR matters. The 
lack of PSA effectiveness in this core area indicates to this author that a state CIP 
practitioner ought to be prepared within his state jurisdiction to facilitate the functions 
tasked to the PSA. 
The IP website lists five of the office’s goals, which are: 
• Goal 1: “Understand and share risk and other information about terrorist 
threats and other hazards to the nation’s critical infrastructure and key 
resources.” 
• Goal 2: “Build and sustain effective CIKR partnerships and coordination 
mechanisms.” 
• Goal 3: “Build and implement a sustainable, national CIKR risk 
management program.” 
• Goal 4: “Ensure efficient use of resources for CIKR management.” 
• Goal 5: “Provide a foundation for continuously improving national CIKR 
preparedness.” 
The DHS website elaborates on each of these goals. The amplification of the 
goals on the website better defines the critical infrastructure protection objectives of DHS 
and is a good guide to help state governments understand how DHS intends to achieve 
CIKR protection nationally. Some excerpts are included here to explain the CIKR 
protection effort and as a reference later to gauge whether the goals are being met or 
whether the information is simply public relations rhetoric. 
The objective of Goal 1, “to understand and share risk and other information 
about terrorist threat and other hazards,” focuses a portion of the effort toward 
information sharing—an effort that has proven to be a challenge to the overall homeland 
security mission. This goal identifies the DHS position that: 
CIKR protection cannot be effective in an atmosphere of limited 
information. Working collaboratively with our security partners, The 
Office of Infrastructure Protection collects and maintains the widest 
possible spectrum of data related to the nation’s critical infrastructures/key 
resources. This data is acquired from our security partners—i.e., regional 
entities and centers; federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments; 
and the private sector—and drawn from information contained in the 
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Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) and the National and Sector CIKR Protection 
Annual Reports, among various other sources, to include periodic data 
calls. 40 
Goal 1 broadly describes the groups that the federal government believes are its 
partners in the realm of sharing CIKR information and threat and warning information. 
However, are the appropriate people in each of these partnerships receiving the 
information, and does the information shared provide value to further the protection 
effort? 
The objective of Goal 2, to “build and sustain effective CIKR partnerships and 
coordination mechanisms,” is an obvious objective of a protection effort. Partnerships 
and coordination are not novel concepts in the homeland security realm. Goal 2 states 
that “effective critical infrastructure and key resources protection requires teamwork, 
communication, collaboration and coordination among all security partners.” Of interest 
is DHS’s stated perspective: “The Office of Infrastructure Protection’s ultimate goal is 
for each element—be it at the regional, state, local, tribal or territorial level—to have the 
ability to conduct its own assessments and analysis, coordinate and collaborate with 
every other element, and share information across all strata of the public and private 
sectors.” This seems to be an ambitious, possibly utopian goal. However, it is essential in 
order to relieve the federal government of the burden to inventory, assess, and coordinate 
the protection of the nation’s entire infrastructure. The enduring challenge in fulfilling 
this goal is for the federal government to engender the will and commitment from all of 
its identified partners. The quality of the assessments and analysis is critical. Deficient 
assessments and analysis based on faulty information will be useless. Ultimately, this is a 
worthy goal but one that will take a long-term commitment from all the partners to 
achieve. 
To leverage the capabilities of its partners and to engender their buy-in, the DHS 
has created Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) and Government Coordinating Councils 
(GCC). The DHS website describes the SCCs as “self-organized, self-run and self-
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governed organizations that represent a spectrum of key stakeholders within a sector.”41 
The GCCs are the government’s peers to the SCCs. The GCCs and SCCs coordinate 
CIKR protection issues across sectors. Two groups that represent the government 
interests with the SCCs are the Federal Senior Leadership Council (FSLC) and the State, 
Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC).42 The 
SLTTGCC is the group with which state and local CIKR protection practitioners should 
develop a relationship in order to gain understanding and remain connected to relevant 
issues in the CIKR protection arena. 
The objective of Goal 3 is to “build and implement a sustainable, national CIKR 
risk management program.” The tone of the 2009 NIPP—to “manage risk” as opposed to 
“securing” infrastructure—may amount to pure semantics, but, given the nature of our 
free society, the vastness of our geography, and the commensurate breadth and 
complexity of the supporting infrastructure, managing risk to CIKR sectors seems to be a 
more achievable objective than securing and protecting all of the CIKR. The issue of 
CIKR risk management will be addressed later in this thesis. However, the role of IP in 
managing risk will be reviewed now. 
According to their website, DHS specifies that IP will establish a program to 
assess risk, initiate protective actions, ensure effective incident response, and prioritize 
resource investment in a transparent and strategic manner. Risk analysis and risk 
management is an area that may be foreign to state CIP practitioners. Knowledge of IP’s 
risk management roles will enable the state CIP practitioner to better understand what he 
should do to support the federal risk management effort. The DHS website establishes 
that “incident management is a key component of the Office of Infrastructure Protection’s 
risk management framework.”43 Philosophically, IP recognizes that effectively managing 
a critical incident translates into diminishing protracted risk. Managing a critical incident 
is an area where state and local emergency managers should understand the roles they 
play and help greatly to manage risk. 
                                                 




The fourth goal of IP, to “ensure efficient use of resources for CIKR risk 
management,” incorporates the objective of the NIPP to invest protection resources in the 
areas of highest priority. Coordinating the effort to prioritize CIKR protection efforts and 
resources is an unenviable task. According to the DHS website, “the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection and its security partners collaborate to define risk management 
needs, establish criteria to rank CIKR priorities, share risk information, and optimize 
finite resources. These determinations, developed through review and coordination of the 
17 Sector Specific Plans and the Sector CIKR Protection Annual Reports in addition to 
other sources, provide the foundation for recommendations and guidance as to how 
federal, state, local and private sector resources are used to best address sector and 
national risk.”44 The state CIP practitioner should know whom to channel their protection 
recommendations to in their state for inclusion in the national CIKR Protection Annual 
Report. In the areas affected by this goal, the state CIP practitioner should know the 
concepts behind risk analysis and, armed with that knowledge should hold IP to its task 
of coordinating the efficient use of resources by advocating their jurisdiction’s CIKR 
vulnerabilities and risk and advocating their state’s requirements to mitigate those 
vulnerabilities and commensurate risk. 
The fifth and final goal, to “provide a foundation for continuously improving 
national CIKR preparedness,” equates to the mantra of any professional to continuously 
improve. IP intends to achieve this goal through the development and exercise of 
continuity of operations (COOP) plans and by partaking in federal, state, and local 
government and private-sector exercises and training opportunities. IP tasks itself to 
guide state and local government and private-sector incident management exercises to 
factor the National Response Framework into their planning efforts. An interesting 
component of Goal 5 is the inclusion of efforts to increase a given community’s 
awareness of its responsibility to protect its CIKR from all hazards. An important element 
of this goal is IP’s effort to develop “national-level critical infrastructure/key resources 
education, training and exercise programs” and “interactive Web- and classroom-based 
critical infrastructures/key resources awareness training programs in partnership with the 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FLETC).”45 Providing professional development education 
opportunities in the realm of CIKR assessment, and protection is critically important to 
the success of the nation’s CIKR protection effort. However, the quality of instruction 
and the content of material from the FEMA and FLETC courses must be superior in order 
to avoid sending poorly trained and ill-informed practitioners to protect our nation. 
A review of IP’s goals provides a wealth of insight for state and local 
governments with respect to their role in CIKR protection in the eyes of DHS. The 
information in the goals can be used as a reference guide to important subjects and 
coordinating entities regarding CIKR protection.  
2. Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Analysis Center 
The Office of Infrastructure Protection has identified understanding and sharing 
CIKR risk and hazard information as Goal # 1. Referencing the DHS website the 
following information was gleaned to provide an overview of the Homeland 
Infrastructure Threat and Analysis Center (HITRAC), an important mechanism to 
achieve IP’s Goal #1. Within HITRAC analysts from IP and the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis work together to provide actionable intelligence that is relevant to 
infrastructure protection. “Actionable intelligence” is the popular vernacular for specific 
and validated intelligence that allows security entities to organize relevant and effective 
operations. Whether or not intelligence producing entities, such as HITRAC, achieve that 
intelligence standard is open to debate. Articles regarding information sharing will be 
analyzed later in this thesis to gauge how well the intelligence and risk analysis needs of 
CIP partners are being met. 
HITRAC is tasked to research and produce infrastructure threat analysis that will 
support its customers’ ability to develop CIKR threat mitigation strategies. The threat 
analysis evaluates enemy tactics and capabilities to identify threats to assets within 
critical infrastructure sectors. The HITRAC concept established a consolidated group of 
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experienced and informed analysts who should be able to focus energy toward 
understanding threats to CIKR sectors and producing accurate assessments of what 
constitutes a relevant threat. It is probably fair to state that their combined expertise 
would exceed the capability that any single state fusion center could direct toward 
analyzing a CIKR sector. Assuming their capability is strong and their analysis is 
relevant, HITRAC is a valuable resource for a state or local government’s CIP program. 
As a component of their charter, HITRAC is tasked to produce state critical infrastructure 
threat assessments with a given state’s local intelligence input. HITRAC should be 
challenged by state CIP practitioners to produce CIKR intelligence specific to their 
needs.  
The complexity of modern CIKR could challenge state and local analysts to 
produce relevant risk analysis. Fortunately, HITRAC is also tasked to provide CIKR risk 
analysis to federal, state, and local government and the private sector. Subject matter 
experts at HITRAC evaluate cyber threats within and across sectors, assist government 
entities to prioritize CIKR assets within their jurisdiction, and develop CIKR modeling 
and simulation scenarios to assist entities to understand whether a presumed risk in fact 
presents a threat to CIKR.  
HITRAC’s task to produce intelligence-based infrastructure threat analysis 
underpins DHS’s overall effort to protect CIKR and supports the critical infrastructure 
protection practitioners at the federal, state, local, and private-sector levels. HITRAC’s 
products are intended to directly support threat mitigation strategies and investment 
decisions of DHS’s CIP partners, inform their partners about physical and cyber threats to 
critical infrastructure, and educate their partners about enemy tactics and capabilities.  
HITRAC is tasked to produce tailored threat assessments in conjunction with state 
and local homeland security professionals. State and local CIP practitioners should be 
fully engaged with HITRAC to provide local information to HITRAC analysts and 
challenge them to provide relevant threat analysis. HITRAC should regularly provide 
state critical infrastructure threat assessments, host weekly threat teleconferences and 
regional threat conferences, provide threat briefing support, and provide critical 
infrastructure threat analysis that addresses specific CIKR sectors and cyber threat  
 36
analysis. Cyber threat is the burgeoning concern for CIP practitioners and one that 
requires experienced, knowledgeable analysts to provide accurate threat and risk 
assessments.  
HITRAC also supports a number of programs, including its infrastructure risk 
analysis partnership program, which assists state and local practitioners to evaluate risk. 
A state CIP program should be actively engaged with HITRAC to develop as much 
understanding of the threat and risk to CIKR in the jurisdiction as is practical.46 
3. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Many people appreciate the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) when it responds to assist communities to recover from large-scale disasters. 
Not as well appreciated is the significant role that FEMA plays in preparing our nation to 
secure critical infrastructure. In the scope of current infrastructure assurance, CIKR 
security is achieved through a full spectrum of actions, including preparedness, 
protection, response, recovery, restoration, resilience, and continuity of operations. The 
concepts listed above are understood by state and local emergency managers, firefighters, 
and police officers due to training, exercising, and when necessary responding to natural 
or man-made disasters. State and local first-responders developed these capabilities prior 
to 9/11 through years of interaction with FEMA. This understanding and established 
relationships can be exploited to help the state and local infrastructure protection 
practitioners and leaders to understand how those same skill sets should be further 
developed and applied proactively to infrastructure protection. 
When released in May of 1998, PDD 63 established FEMA as the lead federal 
agency for emergency fire services and continuity of government.47 However, under the 
current NIPP FEMA is not identified specifically as a sector specific agency or as a lead 
agency to coordinate security for any of the CIKR sectors. However, the activities that  
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state and local governments have been directed to accomplish and the capabilities that 
they have developed to achieve emergency response with FEMA will be effective to meet 
current DHS CIKR directives. 
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina certainly motivated state and local 
governments to sharpen their capacity to respond to major disasters and appreciate that 
they need to continuously improve their response capability. In a similar light, state 
government should strive to better understand critical infrastructure vulnerability issues 
and to better appreciate the proactive role necessary to avoid infrastructure disaster. As 
seen in the response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA plays a huge role in recovering from 
disaster by restoring the critical infrastructure to deliver services to the public. 
A FEMA-coordinated federal response is achieved through the mobilization and 
deployment of emergency support functions (ESF). There are 15 ESFs, representing a 
variety of capabilities, for example, transportation, engineering, communication, public 
health, search and rescue, and firefighting. Each of the ESFs has an assigned ESF 
coordinator. The ESF coordinator is a federal agency; for example, the Department of 
Transportation is the ESF coordinator for ESF #1, Transportation, and the Department of 
Defense (US Army Corps of Engineers) is the federal coordinator for ESF #3, Public 
Works and Engineering.48 It should be understood that federal assistance to state and 
local governments is regulated under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) that requires a presidential declaration of 
disaster or emergency within an area before FEMA can dispense funds or equipment on 
behalf of the federal government. The incident must clearly exceed a state and local 
government’s capacity to manage the event in order for the president to make a 
declaration.49 
As identified in the NIPP, “the NIPP risk management framework recognizes and 
builds on existing public and private sector protective programs and resiliency strategies 
in order to be cost effective and to minimize the burden on CIKR owners and 
                                                 
48 National Response Framework, 58. 
49 Ibid., 40. 
 38
operators.”50 It makes sense to leverage the existing capabilities that state and local 
governments and the private sector have developed for disaster response. The disaster 
response capabilities are identified in the National Response Framework (NRF). The 
NRF is an important document for state and local CIP practitioners to digest because it 
outlines the roles of the federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private 
sector, in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. “The NIPP, The National 
Preparedness Guidelines (NPG) and the National Response Framework (NRF) together 
provide a comprehensive, integrated approach to the homeland security mission.”51 Many 
public/private partnerships were established through historical efforts of FEMA well 
before the NIPP was a strategy. The NIPP identifies that, “NIPP partnerships and 
processes provide the foundation for the CIKR dimension of the NRF, facilitating threat 
and incident management across a spectrum of activities, including incident prevention, 
response and recovery.”52 
The NRF identifies “layered mutually supporting capabilities” as a doctrinal 
approach to national emergency response that should be adopted in steady state critical 
infrastructure protection. “Communities, tribes, States, the Federal government, NGOs 
and the private sector should each understand their roles and responsibilities and 
compliment each other in achieving shared goals. Each governmental layer plays a 
prominent role in developing capabilities needed to respond to incidents.”53 Certainly, 
emergency managers, firefighters, and police understand how to complement FEMA’s 
role in responding to large-scale emergencies. In these instances, the focus of the state 
and local government is to restore the delivery of goods and services. 
The National Response Framework (NRF) is an important federal strategy that 
should be understood by state and local first responders, critical infrastructure protection 
practitioners, and their leadership. The NRF is a good guide for identifying the 
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relationships and integration necessary for federal, state, and local CIP practitioners to 
posture their agency to succeed in infrastructure protection. 
4. Sector Specific Federal Agencies 
As identified earlier, the task of protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure is 
vast and complex. Although the Department of Homeland Security is tasked to 
coordinate the overall CIKR effort, the responsibility for managing aspects of that effort 
is shared across many agencies of the federal government. For the purpose of the national 
CIKR protection effort, many federal agencies have been assigned responsibility to direct 
their support to a particular critical infrastructure sector. HSPD-7 identifies the federal 
departments and agencies to support a particular infrastructure sector. According to 
NIPP, “the SSAs are responsible for working with DHS and their respective GCC 
(Government Coordinating Council) to: implement the NIPP sector partnership model 
and risk management framework; develop protective programs, resiliency strategies, and 
related requirements; and provide sector-level CIKR protection in line with the 
overarching guidance established by DHS pursuant to HSPD-7.”54 
The development of Sector Specific Plans (SSP) is a significantly important task 
assigned to the SSAs and results in a product that state CIP practitioners should be aware 
of. SSAs coordinate the development of a security plan for each of the critical 
infrastructure sectors in conjunction with the private-sector infrastructure asset owners 
and operators. Many of the SSPs are classified “For Official Use Only” and are available 
through the Protective Security Advisor assigned to the state. State and local practitioners 
should review the SSPs relevant to infrastructure in their jurisdiction to gain a better 
understanding of what is tasked in the security plan and to appreciate what is not in the 
plan. The plans are written from a national-level perspective and therefore do not task 
specific states; however, the general guidance will provide the reader with a better 
appreciation for issues within the sector and the general tasks recommended to better 
secure that sector.55  
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This author reviewed many of the publicly available SSPs. Of the SSPs reviewed 
each simply reiterates guidance from the NIPP with language relative to its infrastructure 
sector. For example, the SSPs for the water sector and the critical manufacturing sector 
each reads like the regurgitation of NIPP guidance cloaked in that sector’s parlance. 
There is very little specific guidance detailing how to provide for a particular sector’s 
protection.  
An additional benefit of the SSA to the state CIP practitioner is through the SSA’s 
ability to influence and encourage private-sector businesses within a given sector to share 
information among their potential competitors and with the government. As often stated, 
85 percent of the critical infrastructure in this country is owned by the private sector, 
which often views its internal information as proprietary and sensitive to its ability to 
maintain an edge over the competition. The fact that many of these privately owned 
businesses share security and other information among their competitors and with the 
government is significant. 
Direct interaction with the SSAs might best be served by a state’s homeland 
security advisor, as opposed to an individual member of a state government’s 
Infrastructure Protection Unit. Absent direct interaction by the state HLS advisor, indirect 
inquiries of the SSA can be made through the state PSA. 
Figure 1 lists the SSAs and their commensurate CIKR sectors. 
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Figure 1.   National Infrastructure Protection, 2009 
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AS A SECTOR SPECIFIC AGENCY 
With respect to the national critical infrastructure protection effort, the 
Department of Defense is identified as the sector specific agency to coordinate the 
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securing of the defense infrastructure sector (DIS), which includes the defense industrial 
base (DIB). The overall DIS is divided into segments for which lead agents are tasked to 
oversee their security. The DoD’s role in infrastructure protection was selected for 
analysis for several reasons: it has a history of conducting vulnerability analysis of 
infrastructure, the DIS is inclusive of a broad scope of assets residing within state 
jurisdictions, and DoD is perceived as having an obvious capacity to provide security for 
our nation’s CIKR. As stated, DoD’s task to coordinate security of the DIS dictates that 
the DoD will be engaged with many CIKR-sector asset owners and state government. 
It is important to understand what the DIB is and to understand the SSA mission 
with respect to the DIB. A Government Accountability Office report describes the DIB as 
“a global network of critical physical and cyber infrastructure to project, support, and 
sustain its (i.e., DoD’s) forces and operations world-wide.”56 That description provides a 
general perspective of the potential importance of the DIB but does not definitively 
describe the type of physical and cyber assets that compose the network. The website for 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy further describes the DIB as “the 
DoD, U.S. Government, and private-sector worldwide industrial complex with 
capabilities to perform research and development, design, produce, deliver and maintain 
military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military 
requirements. The DIB includes hundreds of thousands of domestic and foreign entities 
and their subcontractors performing work for DoD and other federal agencies.”57 This 
explanation provides more than enough information to appreciate that elements of the 
DIB are interwoven throughout the nation and any given state.  
A GAO report describes the importance of the DIB explaining that “the 
incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction of one or more of its assets would seriously 
damage the DoD’s ability to carry out its core-missions.” Considering that reality it 
should be noted that specifically identifying assets comprising the DIB may violate 
classified information security. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and America’s Security Affairs (HD&ASA) manages the Defense Critical 
                                                 
56 Government Accountability Office, “Defense Critical Infrastructure.” 
57 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 
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Infrastructure Program (DCIP), tasked to secure defense infrastructure.58 The Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs guides the 
DoD’s effort to secure the DIB, develops policy to that end, and advocates for resources 
to accomplish the mission. The DoD has the responsibility to identify, assess, prioritize, 
remediate threats, and protect defense critical infrastructure. As the sector specific agency 
for the DIB, DoD has the responsibility to “collaborate with all relevant federal 
departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector, including 
key persons and entities in their infrastructure sector, conduct and facilitate vulnerability 
assessments of the sector, encourage risk management strategies to protect against and 
mitigate the effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources; and 
support sector coordinating mechanisms.”59 
The Department of Defense directive providing guidance for the DIB protection 
effort is 3020.40. That directive stipulates that it is DoD policy that the risk management 
of defense critical infrastructure (DCI) shall be accomplished with other federal 
departments and agencies; state, local, regional, territorial, and tribal entities; the private 
sector; and foreign countries, as appropriate. It also states that DoD will identify, 
prioritize, assess, mediate, and protect DCI, working with federal, state, and local 
governments and the private sector to accomplish those tasks. The protection tasks 
identified under 3020.40 are essentially identical to those identified for other federal 
entities acting as an SSA for other critical infrastructure sectors. How does the DoD 
achieve strategic objectives such as risk management with the state and local entities? 
Further guidance in DoDD 3020.40 recognizes that the primary DoD interaction 
with state and local government may be with a local base or installation commander. The 
directive establishes that the heads of the DoD components, Defense Infrastructure Sector 
Lead Agent (DISLA) and the chief of the National Guard Bureau, “establish the 
necessary lines of communication and promote information sharing with each other and 
with federal departments and agencies; state, local, regional, territorial, and tribal entities; 
the private sector; and foreign countries as appropriate.” The directive also tasks these 
                                                 
58 Government Accountability Office, “Defense Critical Infrastructure.” 
59 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 
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entities to coordinate or consult, as appropriate, with the above-listed entities to 
implement a standardized process for DCI and inter- and intra-dependency identification 
based upon DoD missions. Given this guidance it is quite likely that the state and local 
CIP practitioner would be interacting with members of his state’s National Guard 
forces.60 These entities are instructed to conduct assessments of the threats, hazards, 
vulnerability, and risk to DoD-owned defense critical infrastructure. DODD 3020.40 
tasks the chief of the National Guard to “support the organization and training of 
assessment teams to provide a standardized method to assess vulnerabilities, including 
physical, personnel, and cyber issues, and consequences throughout the DIB.”61 It is in 
this area that state and local governments could target working with the National Guard. 
Considering the nature of the DIB, one might expect that the National Guard has 
assumed a significant role in the nation’s critical infrastructure protection effort. The 
National Guard website highlights the fact that the National Guard Bureau conducts 
CIKR assessments in coordination with the Defense Contract Management Agency, 
designated as the lead agency for the DIB, and with DHS. The National Guard provides 
three nine-person teams made up of Army and Air National Guard personnel. One of 
each of the three teams is from each of the following states: Colorado, New York, and 
West Virginia. The teams conduct “all-hazard, vulnerability assessments” on behalf of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense. The teams support DHS requests for three types of 
assessments: 1) site-assisted visit, 2) buffer zone protection technical assist or buffer zone 
protection workshop and 3) utilizing the Computer Based Assessment Tool (CBAT).62 
With that overview of two significant federal partners established, it is necessary 
to review the role of the most significant partner in the national CIP effort. The private 
sector, as the owner and operator of the predominant percentage of CIKR in this country, 
is the most significant partner. Understanding the private-sector perspective to CIKR 
protection is the key to success. The next chapter will provide some insight into the 
private sector perspective of CIP. 
                                                 
60 Department of Defense Directive 3020.40. 
61 Ibid., 14. 
62 The National Guard’s Role in Homeland Defense. 
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IV. THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS PARTNER 
This chapter will analyze the debate regarding the private sector as a stakeholder 
in the CIKR protection effort and address how the state CIP practitioner can partner with 
the private sector to enhance CIKR protection. Through my research I have identified 
five proposed areas where the private sector’s involvement can affect the posture of the 
national CIKR protection effort. The five areas are addressed as subsections of this 
chapter: 
• The federal government’s value proposition; 
• Managing for reliability; 
• Network security; 
• The insurance option; and 
• The issue of trust. 
Each of the five areas will be analyzed to establish the conceptual benefit of a 
private-sector role in the national CIP effort and to identify where the federal government 
and the state CIP practitioner can facilitate the public/private partnership to enhance 
CIKR protection.  
As addressed earlier, the private sector is identified as having control of 85 
percent of the nation’s CIKR. The genesis of that percentage is nebulous but commonly 
repeated, and it is apparently generally accepted as a fact based on its repeated mention 
throughout relevant literature. However, at least one voice challenges that oft-repeated 
statistic, and it is important to note because of the effect that statistic has on framing the 
private sector’s role in CIP. Dr. Bellavita’s analysis of the impact of that statistic, which 
he qualifies as a proverb in his article “How Proverbs Damage Homeland Security,” is an 
important critique of the CIKR protection effort and challenges the status quo thinking 
within homeland security. Dr. Bellavita identifies the following four reasons why the 85-
percent proverb damages the CIKR protection effort: 
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• It gives the impression that we know more than we do when it comes to 
critical infrastructure; 
• It creates a false image about the power relationships between the public 
and private sectors; 
• It distorts normative understanding about roles and responsibilities; 
• It constrains discussions about policy options.63 
Dr. Bellavita’s thoughts on this subject will be considered throughout my analysis 
of the private-sector role in CIKR protection, and they influence my analysis throughout 
this thesis. 
Despite the lack of validation of the 85-percent proverb, upon consideration of 
different infrastructure sectors such as electric power, petroleum, communication, 
finance, or rail, which are predominantly privately owned, one can begin to fathom that 
the majority of CIKR in this country may be owned or controlled by the private sector. 
Accepting that the private sector controls a majority of the nation’s infrastructure 
qualifies the private sector as a necessary participant to secure CIKR sectors. To 
maximize the national CIP effort, inclusion of the private sector in the nation’s protection 
effort is paramount. It will not be possible to effectively secure CIKR without the 
cooperation and involvement of the private sector, the federal government, and state 
governments.  
What, then, is the private sector’s role in CIP? This chapter will attempt to 
address some of the roles that private industry can undertake to fulfill federal government 
expectations, support state government CIKR protection efforts, and assure delivery of 
services.  
A. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S “VALUE PROPOSITION” 
“The Value Proposition” is addressed in the first pages of the NIPP. That value 
proposition is described as a public-private partnership laying the foundation for 
prevention, response, mitigation, and recovery. 
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1. The Government’s Interest in the Private Sector’s Value 
The NIPP proposition recognizes the value of industry capabilities such as: 
• Their “understanding of CIKR assets, systems, networks, and facilities and 
other capabilities through industry ownership and management;” 
• Their “ability to reduce risk and respond to and recover from incidents;” 
• Their “ability to innovate;” and 
• Their “robust relationships that are useful for sharing and protecting 
sensitive information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures, 
and best practices.”64  
The NIPP wisely acknowledges that these industry capabilities are of value to the 
government, but what value does the private sector realize in its relationship with 
government in these matters?  
For the most part, private-sector involvement to fulfill this national strategy relies 
on its altruism. Stephen E. Flynn, in his article “The Brittle Superpower,” questions 
whether private industry will independently invest in significant infrastructure protection 
measures as envisioned in the NIPP. Flynn comments that “critical infrastructure 
protection and emergency preparedness will not happen if left solely to the 
marketplace.”65 Similarly to Dr. Lewis, Flynn believes that state and local involvement in 
the protection relationship alone will not suffice, and he contends that the effort should be 
led by the federal government. Flynn also argues that the federal government’s attention 
is directed elsewhere, and he questions whether the federal government is sufficiently 
engaged in the CIKR protection effort to achieve the NIPP goals. Is there a clear leader in 
the national CIKR protection effort? Is industry better positioned to lead the national 
CIKR protection effort? Maybe the public-private CIP partnership should be led similarly 
to the national Incident Command System’s doctrine of unity of command where, for 
example, in the CIP partnership each partner has an equal say in the protection effort. 
That unified leadership concept will be recommended later in this thesis. We will now 
                                                 
64 NIPP, 2009, 5. 
65 Flynn, “Brittle Superpower,” 27.  
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look at some enticements for the private sector to participate in the public-private 
partnership. The enticements need to be understood by state CIP practitioners who may 
need to leverage them in their relationships with the private sector. 
One enticement that the NIPP suggests is that the government–private-sector 
relationship support a clear national interest by insuring that the entire spectrum of CIKR 
is protected, which—to the advantage of all partners—also reduces the risk to individual 
sectors and assets. Other enticements to private-sector partnership with government as 
envisioned in the NIPP are that private industry is afforded  
• “Participation in both policy development and risk analysis”; 
• “Greater information sharing regarding specific threats and hazards”; 
• “Targeted application of limited resources to the highest risk issues, to 
include federal grant funding”; 
• “Joint R&D and modeling, simulation, and analysis programs”; and 
• “Access and input into cross-sector interdependency analysis.”66  
Presumably, each of those NIPP-proposed benefits is of sufficient value to attract 
the private-sector partners targeted by this government protection effort. A state 
government CIP practitioner should be aware of whether his private-sector partners value 
these enticements; he should exploit the areas that the private sector values and find a 
mechanism to cajole their interest where they otherwise do not find value. 
The NIPP suggests that the private sector has many contributions to make to 
support the national CIKR protection effort, including their ability to 
• Perform risk assessments; 
• Implement security practices to reduce vulnerabilities; 
• Understand sector dependencies and cross sector interdependencies; 
• Assist federal, state, and local governments in their CIKR inventories; 
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• Coordinate emergency response with federal, state, and local 
governments; 
• Abide by industry best practices for security and share security best 
practices, implement “resilient, robust and/or redundant operational 
systems”; 
• Promote CIKR protection education and training programs and/or share 
security risk and threat information.67 
Of these actions, facilitating private-sector security information sharing with 
respect to identifying threat, risk, and mitigation actions is a priority effort for the federal 
government. Other federal priorities for the private sector include providing a CIKR 
sector’s or system’s operational information to government protection practitioners and 
assisting government’s CIKR practitioners with asset data collection and protection 
efforts. The NIPP encourages the private sector to voluntarily assist the government in its 
CIKR protection efforts. The NIPP presumes private-sector cooperation. In order to gain 
the private sector’s cooperation, it is important for government CIP practitioners to 
appreciate the reasons that the private sector may be reluctant to engage in tasks as 
outlined in the NIPP. 
A significant roadblock to the private sector’s willingness to share threat, risk, and 
vulnerability information with government lies in sharing proprietary information that, if 
leaked, presumably could compromise a company’s marketplace advantage over its 
competitors. In 2002, Congress acknowledged and remedied this very real information 
control concern of private industry when it passed the Protected Critical Infrastructure 
Information (PCII) legislation. PCII restricts access to critical infrastructure information 
and protects that information from release via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests as well as state government “sunshine laws.” The legislation requires the 
collector of PCII to practice rigorous information protection protocols. Critical 
infrastructure information (CII) that is collected by federal employees or entities  
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collecting the information on behalf of the federal government that meets the legislated 
criteria of CII will be afforded the PCII protections. PCII-qualified information cannot be 
used for regulatory purposes.68 
Another important aspect of the public-private information sharing issue revolves 
around government actually sharing threat information or intelligence with private 
industry. The crux of the threat information sharing issue is evident in comments penned 
by General Robert Marsh, who wrote, “A specific challenge that still eludes us is defining 
an effective relationship between public and private sectors. Effective sharing of threat, 
vulnerability, and incident information—essential to the protection of our 
infrastructures—has advanced little in spite of the rhetoric, commissions, councils, and 
strategies that dot the critical infrastructure landscape. Effective frameworks for working 
together, schemas for information sharing, and incentive mechanisms, here and abroad, 
still have not emerged.”69 Given that General Marsh’s comments are accurate and that a 
perception exists that little progress has been achieved in the national CIP effort, why 
waste time getting involved in government’s stagnant effort? 
This author’s professional experiences surrounding the issue of sharing threat 
information with the private sector led to the opinion that the issue is related more to the 
private sector’s perception that government does not trust it to share intelligence than to 
the government’s resistance to share information. While assigned to the State Fusion 
Center at Logan International Airport, many private sector representatives that I 
interacted with believed that the threat information provided to them could not be all the 
available relevant threat information. In my experience the private sector perceived that 
federal and state government were not sharing threat information with them due to a lack 
of trust. State government shared the threat information it had that it believed was 
relevant for the private sector to implement security operations against those threats. In 
general, the lack of specific information shared is due to the lack of credible, specific 
information relevant to CIKR protection. 
                                                 
68 PCII information provided is based upon the author’s Department of Homeland Security–sponsored 
PCII training required to conduct CIKR assessments and to use the Automated Critical Asset Management 
System. More in-depth information can be found at www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CII_Act.pdf. 
69 Marsh, “Foreword,” xv. 
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A well-developed public-private partner relationship would go a long way for 
government and the private sector to learn about the others’ information needs and 
expectations. With respect to threat information sharing, the private sector perceives that 
the government mistrusts it because it is not receiving specific intelligence about threats 
to CIKR. The state CIP practitioner must engage the private sector in regular work 
groups and seminars to develop the trust needed to assuage private-sector concerns about 
being left out of the threat information sharing loop, to gain an understanding of the 
private sector’s information needs, and to develop effective emergency response plans 
integrating the private sector. We will look at the private sector’s concerns about 
partnering with government in the next section. 
2. Private-Sector Concerns 
To be effective partners in the CIP protection partnership with the private sector, 
government CIP practitioners should understand the management and business 
operational reality that influences private-sector security decisions. To that end we will 
examine an interesting daily reality of the private sector that affects its decision 
making—the constant pressure to increase competitiveness through operational efficiency 
and the vulnerabilities stemming from that reality.  
a. Vulnerabilities of Efficiency 
Technology and automation are often used to trim operational costs. 
Unnecessary costs are eliminated by leveraging outside networks such as the Internet for 
communication. Reliance on the Internet as the backbone of communication may expose 
a corporation to risk beyond its ability to mitigate. The constant pressure to increase 
competitiveness by reducing costs may result in a corporate decision not to further invest 
in security measures that would protect against a threat assessed as a low probability. 
Additionally, as noted by Auerswald, et al., “Competitive pressures do not allow firms to 
make large investments aimed at reducing vulnerability to disasters that are highly 
unlikely and nearly impossible to predict.”70 Stephen Flynn aptly postulates that, “the 
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reluctance to invest in security stems from managers’ need to make infrastructure open to 
as many users as possible, efficient as possible, reliable as possible and low cost as 
possible to use. Because the conventional view of security is that it raises costs, 
undermines efficiency, is at odds with assuring reliability and constrains access, there has 
been a clear disincentive for the private sector to make it a priority.”71 However, the 
public or private-sector CIKR asset owner’s ability to insure delivery of goods and 
services is directly contingent upon securing the assets that facilitate delivery of service. 
From the perspective of the asset owner, properly securing those assets is a good business 
practice commensurate with exercising due diligence. An asset owner’s failure to insure 
the protection of assets from reasonable threat might then make the asset owner liable 
through the legal principle of vicarious liability.72 
b. Endogenous or Exogenous Vulnerabilities 
Auerswald’s writing team describes security vulnerabilities as either 
“endogenous,” borne of human error, or “exogenous,” resulting purely from an act of 
nature where human action did not factor into the event. Unfortunately, in our 
interconnected, modern, and efficient society we are highly vulnerable to the endogenous 
events that may spread across networks. 
The location and type of the next act of terrorism, an endogenous event, is 
for the most part unpredictable. In the security world the ability to gauge the degree of 
risk to which a CIKR asset is vulnerable is integral to the security investment decision. 
That investment decision becomes more challenging when a terrorist group practices 
what Auerswald’s team refers to as “adaptive predation.”73 Adaptive predation is 
described as the adversarial tactic of adapting one’s modus operandi (MO) to exploit gaps 
in existing security protocols that were enacted to mitigate the adversaries’ current MO. 
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That tactic makes it extremely difficult to invest in a security protocol that potentially 
becomes operationally irrelevant soon after implementation. In addition to terrorist 
threats, we willl now review other threats that CIKR managers must consider. 
Auerswald identifies three types of low probability, high-consequence 
events that must be considered by industry managers: natural disasters like earthquakes or 
hurricanes, “‘technogenic’ disasters resulting from bad systems design, inappropriate 
regulatory frameworks, and political managerial failure”; and terrorist attacks.74 
Auerswald identifies four broad categories of action that industry can take to insure 
delivery of services by compensating for the low-probability, high-consequence events. 
Those categories are “managing organizations, securing networks, creating markets and 
building trust.”75 Each of the broad categories of action will be reviewed to establish 
mitigation actions available to the private sector. Of the four categories of action 
recommended for the private sector, managing organizations, creating markets, and 
building trust seem to be areas that state government would promote. Securing networks 
at the CIKR sector level potentially exceeds the ability of state and local jurisdictions to 
lend meaningful support. However, securing networks is an area where state and local 
CIP practitioners should be conversant, and it will be briefly touched upon later in this 
chapter. 
B. MANAGING FOR RELIABILITY 
Interestingly, with respect to managing organizations, Auerswald uses the FAA as 
an example of how to operate a critical service under severe pressures, facing a range of 
threats, including the low-probability, high-consequence event, while continuously 
delivering effective, reliable service. The premise is that because the FAA rate of failure 
is so low FAA management practices should be considered as a model for private-
industry CIKR owners and operators to emulate in order to insure the reliable delivery of  
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service. That is, effective management matters. Effective management is an investment 
that all CIKR partners can make that will realize benefits during daily operations as well 
as during a crisis. 
1. Reliability Through Effective Management 
The operative concept in the following analysis of a successful management 
practice is reliability. Setting the goal of delivering reliable service as the objective of 
critical infrastructure strategy is a departure from the government’s current framing of the 
issue. As noted by Todd La Porte with respect to critical infrastructure protection, “Since 
the issue surfaced in the early 1990s, public and business leaders have directed the 
public’s attention toward critical infrastructures, rather than, say, essential services; 
toward protection of those infrastructures, rather than assurance of the services these 
infrastructures deliver.” 76 Assurance of service incorporates actions that include physical 
and operational security measures—technology investments to streamline business 
processes—but more importantly it incorporates management practices of high 
functioning organizations, such as the FAA, with a near-flawless track record of 
delivering reliable service.  
The current infrastructure protection paradigm for law enforcement and security 
professionals focuses CIKR protection efforts toward actions such as physical security 
measures, distributing assets, or protecting critical nodes to mitigate vulnerabilities. As 
described by LaPorte, emergency managers view the solution to the CIKR protection 
effort from the perspective of avoiding disaster by building assets in areas outside of 
hazard zones, responding to emergencies by dispatching first responders, and recovering 
from disasters by cleaning up damaged areas, rebuilding damaged assets, and restoring 
services.77 Yet, another alternative to avoiding significant and costly disruptions is 
through strong, effective management. 
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In an article, “Managing for the Unexpected,” La Porte contends that the 
emergency manager’s solutions are important contributions. Unfortunately, those 
solutions to critical infrastructure assurance miss the real value of effectively managing 
infrastructure systems to assure reliable service throughout a disaster. However, La Porte 
acknowledges that the management practices that insure reliable service may impinge on 
a company’s financial bottom line. Those practices incorporate redundancy, intensive and 
repeated operator training, and frequent equipment testing and replacement. Insuring that 
these practices are implemented consistently throughout and across all sectors is 
challenging.78 An important note in this effort is that in our open and free society CIKR 
spread over a vast geographic area cannot be guaranteed to be reliable all the time. CIKR 
is exposed to operational risks daily. Private sector management of those risks will be 
addressed in the next section. 
2. Managing Risk 
The process of calculating and managing risk is integral to the CIKR protection 
mission and will be addressed more thoroughly in the next chapter. Now we will briefly 
review the private sector’s perspective of managing risk. In order to consistently and 
reliably deliver service under modern marketplace pressures, it is necessary for 
companies to effectively balance risk. Competitive pressures often drive a risk 
management calculus that results in finding the operational point where there is sufficient 
security to protect an asset while facilitating a smooth, efficient operation. An extreme 
example of an unbalanced, yet secure operation might be an airline implementing a 
security program that restricts passengers from bringing luggage onto the aircraft in order 
to guarantee that a terrorist does not secret a bomb in the luggage. Those extreme 
measures would likely drive customers away and lead to the company’s going out of 
business. 
A CIKR owner would utilize comparative risk analysis to decide what degree of 
risk he is willing to assume in comparison to the imposition of recommended security 
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practices in order to minimize the risk on his operation.79 During that process risk 
managers would also consider the concept of countervailing risk. Countervailing risk 
addresses whether the steps implemented to mitigate one threat in fact create a secondary 
risk that is worse than the original threat it was created to avoid.80 These risk analysis 
steps are important to calculate accurately in order for a company to develop a business 
model that allows competition in the marketplace while assuring reliable service. 
The following section will review some suggestions from Robert Frosch and 
Todd LaPorte for managing CIKR toward the reliable delivery of service. 
a. Redundancy 
One suggestion, when designing operating systems or processes, is to 
build in redundancy where design engineers most expect critical components to fail. 
Redundant systems may add to the cost of an operating system, but in the right places 
they can geometrically improve the reliability of a system. Robert Frosch addresses the 
value of creating redundancy by adding more humans to oversee an operation. His idea is 
that added sets of experienced eyes overseeing a process will more likely detect a 
problem in the system and therefore remedy a problem more quickly than a company 
with fewer managers to detect and solve problems. Frosch acknowledges that adding 
additional managers must be factored within reason to avoid creating countervailing risk 
in the form of “coordination tax,” where too many additional management layers creates 
delays in communicating directives to resolve a situation. Frosch addresses this 
consideration by pointing out that other “organizational means,” such as creating trust in 
the workplace, can mitigate coordination tax. Conceptually, a high level of trust across all 
echelons of employees who share information about the process and effectively 
communicate identified problems would bring about solutions and eliminate the need to 
add an additional layer of management.81 
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b. The Value of Reliability 
The company that reliably delivers its goods or services is valued. Private-
sector managers strive to achieve value for the company through reliability. However, 
according to Frosch, it is necessary to find a balance point between being reliable and 
being functional. Frosch argues that “in the attempt to create a high reliability 
organization, the greatest problem seems to be achieving the balance between 
organizational discipline (necessary for its existence and reliability) and the open, 
informal structure needed for a functioning team. The countervailing risk to the high 
reliability team is that bureaucratic niceties will become a kind of self-defeating solution 
to problems. Formal discipline can destroy exactly those properties of the team that make 
it function.”82 
Todd R. La Porte identified characteristics of the highly reliable 
organization, as in Figure 2. 
State CIP practitioners need to understand the reality of operating CIKR in 
the private sector and to appreciate the risk management practices that assure the delivery 
of service. The next section will review the topic of network security and the risk that 
private sector networks create for CIKR. 
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Figure 2.   Characteristics of the Highly Reliable Organization (from LaPorte, 
“Challenges”) 
C. NETWORK SECURITY 
With respect to securing networks, the underlying premise is that most CIKR 
sectors are only as secure as the weakest link in the networks that connect them. The 
nature of the interconnected CIKR world means that an asset that has practiced security 
due diligence within a given sector may be at risk to damage due to the weak security of 
another asset within the same network. This same propagation of risk or cascading failure 
within a networked CIKR sector due to the poor security practices of one entity also 
applies across interconnected CIKR sectors where one underprotected asset can infect 
other CIKR sectors. This network vulnerability is addressed in depth by Dr. Ted Lewis in 
his book Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security. The dependencies and 
interdependencies within and across networked critical infrastructure sectors are 
complex. Dr Lewis advises that the most effective manner to secure a network is to 
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identify the critical nodes linking the network and invest resources toward securing those 
nodes before investing in each individual asset in the network.83 
1. What Is the Threat? 
When discussing network security the average individual probably thinks of the 
Internet, computers, and cyber security. In his chapter “A Cyber Threat to National 
Security?” Sean Gorman questions whether the cyber threat is as significant as is often 
described in the media. Gorman cites Washington Monthly columnist Joshua Greene, 
who claims, “There is no such thing as cyber terrorism—no instance of anyone ever 
having been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there 
compelling evidence that Al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted to 
computers for any sort of serious destructive activity.”84 What, then, explains the national 
concern from this threat?  
Much of the furor in the media over a terrorist threat against critical infrastructure 
utilizing cyber systems may be overblown. Prognosticators exist with opposing views as 
to whether the threat is significant or not. An interesting study undertaken by the Navy 
War College to simulate a cyber attack against CIKR revealed that “a group of hackers 
couldn’t single handedly bring down the United States’ national data infrastructure, but a 
terrorist team would be able to do significant localized damage to U.S. systems.” Gorman 
noted that the researchers predicted that an attack targeting nationwide infrastructure 
would require “$200 million in funding, country level intelligence, and five years of 
preparation.”85 That study certainly establishes some parameters for discussing the nature 
and extent of the cyber threat. Quite likely, terrorist groups would not present a 
significant national cyber security threat unless they were backed by a nation-state 
providing the group with intelligence and significant funding. Nevertheless, the study 
indicates that our CIKR could be at risk from a nation-state that could exploit our cyber 
networks to attack our national infrastructure.  
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Of greater national concern is the fact that numerous nation-states are developing 
cyber warfare capabilities. Currently, the strength and abilities of the United States 
military are unparalleled. No other military can match our military’s strength. Other 
nations must use asymmetric means to undermine our nation’s military advantage and 
often look to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to degrade our military capabilities. Cyber 
attacks initiated by nation-states against the United States may target our industries in 
order to disrupt those systems and undermine our national power or to conduct electronic 
espionage to steal proprietary information. In a recent example, the Chinese government 
was accused by Google of conducting cyber attacks against computers and servers within 
its network.86 There is mounting evidence that the threat of cyber attack is growing, but 
what is vulnerable in the cyber network?  
2. Cyber Network Vulnerability? 
Cyber systems are composed of physical infrastructure like fiber optic cables, 
juncture boxes, servers, hubs, and computers. Each of the components is vulnerable to 
physical damage as a means to disrupt the network it is part of. Poorly designed software, 
the second component of a cyber network, creates another risk to the network. According 
to Gorman, there has not been enough research to indicate whether vulnerabilities in 
physical components or vulnerabilities in software place cyber networks more at risk to 
damage. Cyber attacks initiated through the exploitation of software vulnerabilities 
receive a good degree of publicity, but none of those attacks has resulted in a catastrophe. 
“While cases of major catastrophes from cyber attacks have not yet been documented, the 
tools, motivations, abilities and potentials have been documented.”87 
Gorman sets the table, explaining, “In no other critical infrastructure sector are 
vulnerabilities more publicly seen than in cyber systems, which include the logical and 
physical network of computers, servers, fiber optic cables, and other components that 
constitute the nation’s information infrastructure. Worms, viruses, and denial of service 
attacks happen daily, and the largest and most devastating are covered in the media.” He 
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later states, “The question with cyber security is not whether there are vulnerabilities, but 
whether there is a threat that warrants federal involvement, or whether it is simply a 
business issue that should be left to the market.”88 As noted earlier, market strategies in 
other CIKR sectors aimed at streamlining operational costs to enhance competitiveness 
create vulnerabilities. So, too, the existence of vulnerabilities in cyber networks is 
attributed to software and systems designers who take shortcuts in their quality-control 
procedures in order to develop a product more inexpensively. 
3. What Can State Government and the Private Sector Do? 
Although these cyber warfare issues are real concerns, the detection and response 
to nation-state–directed cyber attacks within the United States are within the realm of the 
federal government and not that of state government or the private sector. An area of 
cyber security where state government can assist the national effort is to become 
knowledgeable and conversant in cyber security issues. State government must 
implement industry best practices, enter into partnerships with local industry focused on 
facilitating network security, and encourage local industry to implement best practices as 
well. The goal of encouraging all to maintain the best-practices standard for cyber 
security relates to network theory, where managing the risk of damage to an entire sector 
requires strengthening all assets in that sector. The underlying premise is that the risk 
facing one entity in a network or supply chain may be mitigated by the actions of all the 
entities within that network. Making the case within a network that encourages all the 
participants to invest similarly in security may prove challenging. However, influencing a 
number of entities to invest appropriately for security may be enough to initiate a change 
of action that influences the remaining entities to invest appropriately. 
Ultimately, it may take financial incentive to industry to implement responsible 
cyber security practices. The state government should engage its federal government 
partners to provide incentive for private industry. One mechanism to generate incentive 
for the private sector to comply with enhanced CIKR security is through insurance. 
Gregory Jaksec discusses the government utilization of insurance regulations to impose 
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CIKR security standards on the private sector in his thesis, Public-Private-Partnering in 
Critical Infrastructure Protection.89 Imposing additional insurance regulations may not 
be necessary to achieve private-sector compliance. Appealing to private sector altruism 
may be more successful in achieving enhanced CIKR security standards. Convincing the 
first few asset owners to comply may be what is needed to get all to comply. The benefits 
and limitations of the insurance option will be analyzed next. 
D. THE INSURANCE OPTION 
An emerging topic related to critical infrastructure assurance is the creation of a 
new market to assure infrastructure reliability. There is a growing market within the 
insurance industry for terrorism insurance. Within the realm of critical infrastructure 
protection, insurance is viewed as a tool to promote infrastructure assurance. Private 
industry may view the insurance proposition like this: insurers are acknowledged experts 
on risk analysis and risk management; and insurers are members of the private sector who 
can evaluate an industry’s secrets without raising industry’s concern of government 
intervention and regulation. An insurance company underwriting a CIKR asset may 
require the asset owner to invest in security measures that reduce both the infrastructure 
asset owner’s risk and the insurer’s risk. However, the notion that the process of insuring 
an asset may prompt the asset owner to invest in security measures to reduce its risk 
exposure and conversely reduce the insurance premium may prove false.90 A company 
that is insured for loss may calculate that it does not need to invest in security to mitigate 
or deter a threat event because it is insured against losses incurred from that threat event. 
Insurance may prove not to be the entire solution to the private sector’s ensuring reliable 
delivery of service, but it is a component of the overall solution. 
The insurance remedy as a mechanism to infrastructure assurance is worthy of 
note. Consider, for example, the need to return life to normal as quickly as possible in the 
aftermath of a catastrophe or large-scale attack. Well-insured asset owners could be 
compensated quickly, allowing them to quickly repair their operations and return to 
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delivering goods and services. A lack of insurance coverage could delay the return of 
services due to a lack of funding to rebuild. Funding a rebuilding effort can be a huge 
undertaking. For example, the costs to recover from 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, or more 
recently the BP oil spill cleanup costs and financial compensation to those unable to work 
in the aftermath of the spill have been astronomical.91 Neither the government nor 
industry alone could fund the recovery operations. Insurance companies helped to spread 
the cost of recovery. In many catastrophes the insurance industry is an important partner 
in the recovery operation. Businesses with the proper insurance coverage were better 
postured financially to more quickly return to operation.  
There are challenges to the insurance solution. For example, in order for insurance 
companies to calculate the insurance rate or premium they must know the degree of risk 
to which an asset is vulnerable. In actuarial tables historical data is utilized to calculate 
the likelihood of a catastrophic event and the degree of risk to which an asset is exposed. 
As to the likelihood of a terrorist attack targeting a given asset, calculating the type of 
attack that will occur and calculating the resulting degree of damage is difficult. “One of 
the central issues at stake in the financing of catastrophic risks is to determine appropriate 
insurance mechanisms with specific premiums for events with relatively low frequency 
and with the potential to inflict massive disruption and/or destruction.”92 
The degree of uncertainty inherent in calculating the risk exposure that an asset 
faces from terrorism and in setting commensurate premiums to spread the risk may be a 
deterrent to insurance companies. Conversely, the cost of premiums imposed by the 
insurer on high-risk assets may exceed the willingness of the clients to pay. The 
insurance company approach to high-risk assets may entail requiring industry to mitigate 
vulnerabilities by implementing prudent security measures to lower its risk exposure as a 
precondition of coverage under a policy.93 Potentially, the insurance-induced security 
measures may be less stringent than a company would consider taking to protect against 
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loss if it were not insured. Of course, in some cases insurance-imposed security measures 
could be more stringent than those of a company that elected not to implement any 
security measures because of the drain it would place on the bottom line. 
There is no established minimum standard for security measures designed to 
mitigate vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure. Although there are many varieties of 
physical security measures to deter, detect, or mitigate a terrorist threat, the government 
has not established the minimum standard to be adopted by the private sector. 
Complicating the issue of setting security standards is the reality that many business 
owners do not believe that they are at risk of being the target of a terrorist attack. Without 
the perception of a higher level of threat that one’s business will be directly impacted by 
a terrorist attack, what is the incentive to invest in insurance? Further complicating this 
issue and undermining the insurer’s ability to make terrorism insurance policies attractive 
by offering credit for security measures implemented is the fact that “no research to date 
has defined causal relationships linking specific mitigation measures with quantifiable 
reductions in terrorism loss, there is no technical basis for an insurance pricing credit.”94 
The lack of appropriate metrics to objectively measure the return on a security investment 
will be analyzed later in this thesis. 
Certainly government has a role to encourage the insurance industry to participate 
in underwriting insurance policies for CIKR owners. Government involvement in the 
aftermath of a catastrophe can affect future efforts of insurers. If the government 
compensates all of the affected entities for their loss, there is no incentive for entities to 
insure themselves in advance of an event. Also, government actions in advance of 
terrorist action may impact whether that event actually takes place or whether it achieves 
the impact as planned. Those actions can reduce the amount of risk that an insurance 
company assumes when underwriting a CIKR asset. Effective government-led recovery 
actions in the aftermath of a catastrophe can also significantly reduce the financial losses 
incurred and by extension limit the amount of claims that insurers pay to customers. 
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The symbiotic relationship between government action and insurers’ actions with 
respect to pre- and post-catastrophe actions must be cultivated in order to manage the 
impact of catastrophes and to establish a greater CIKR resilience. The foundation for that 
government/private-sector relationship could be built on trust. 
E. THE ISSUE OF TRUST 
Building mutual trust among the government, the private-sector partners in CIP, 
and the public may be the key to successful critical infrastructure protection. As 
evidenced in the 2009 NIPP, the federal government understands that it must build trust 
with the private sector in order to achieve its goals in CIKR protection. The private sector 
must ensure the trust of its customers as well as the government, whom they will rely 
upon to assist them to avoid or recover from a disaster. Establishing and maintaining trust 
will be a continuous and difficult journey. As Branscomb and Michel-Kerjan 
acknowledge, “The habits and cultures and the legal, political, and financial power 
among a complex mosaic of stakeholders differ in many ways. This leads us to an 
essential element of all enduring and successful partnerships: The necessity for building 
trust between the parties.”95 
1. Trust Built on Information Sharing 
Information sharing could be an exploitable mechanism to develop a mutually 
trusting relationship between government and the private sector. As addressed earlier in 
this thesis, information sharing is an important component of an effective CIKR 
protection strategy. There is a potential stumbling block to government’s sharing of 
intelligence with the private sector. Private industry desires government intelligence 
information to develop more relevant and effective security measures. Governments 
releasing that information to the private sector could jeopardize or compromise 
intelligence information gathering operations and sources.96  
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The challenges to effective information sharing transcend all levels of the national 
protection effort among federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. 
There are many different and apparently competing interests that can obscure and 
confound the information sharing process. Clearly, in our global economy, with 
interconnected CIKR crossing national borders, mutual trust between not only industry 
partners but nations as well has become a necessity. It will take strong leadership to 
develop trust among all the partners. It will take even stronger and committed leadership 
to maintain those trusted relationships. 
2. Valuing and Protecting Proprietary Information 
We addressed the PCII protections afforded to private-sector CIKR proprietary 
data collected on behalf of the federal government. Those PCII protections do not provide 
information protection, though, for proprietary information to be shared among industry 
competitors. Consider the following potential problems of sharing proprietary 
information within industry:  
• Information about a company’s security vulnerabilities may be of interest 
to other companies networked in the industry purely for calculating and 
managing their own potential risk;  
• One company’s proprietary information, if disclosed to a competitor, 
could eliminate the first company’s competitive advantage; 
• Certain elements of data, if released to competitors, could compromise 
privacy clauses between industry and its customers.  
How, then, does one convince owners and operators of private-sector CIKR to 
share their security vulnerabilities with one of their competitors?  
A proposed solution by Branscomb and Michel-Kerjan to overcome private 
industry’s reticence to share information with its competitors entails creating “trusted 
information sharing platforms.” The platforms would be populated with proprietary 
information collected by a third party to the CIKR asset owners. The third party would 
aggregate the data, remove privacy information, and then allow industry partners access 
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to the aggregated data to evaluate important security trends.97 Federal and state 
government can play a role in encouraging industry leaders to develop information 
sharing relationships with their competitors and government. Government can be the 
third party to share information pertaining to prevention, mitigation, and recovery plans, 
and government could provide threat and risk information based upon vetted intelligence. 
It should not be a surprise to realize that the information gathering and processing 
capabilities of some private corporations may exceed or parallel those of government 
agencies. In that regard some industry partners may have information or intelligence of 
interest to government. Nonetheless, the degree of information sharing required to attain 
the level of situational awareness necessary to effectively secure CIKR sectors does not 
currently exist. Developing a culture of information sharing could perpetuate the trusting 
relationships necessary to maintaining that culture. Government at all levels must be 
involved in developing the culture and maintaining the relationships between the 
government and the private sector. Those government actions will be addressed more in 
the next chapter. 
                                                 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 69
V. THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ROLES 
OF STATE GOVERNMENT: TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC  
As addressed earlier in this thesis, the 2009 NIPP recommends a series of general 
actions that state governments can take to support the national infrastructure protection 
effort. The 2009 NIPP also recommends the Risk Management Framework as a structure 
for the states to follow in order to coordinate their CIP efforts with federal and private-
sector partners. The NIPP does not prescribe specific steps to be taken by the states to 
best accomplish the recommended actions. The absence of specific guidance suggests 
that the federal government lacks the knowledge and experience to offer more definitive 
guidance on how to effectively carry out its recommendations. Alternatively, the cover 
letter for the Guide to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection at the State, 
Regional, Local, Tribal and Territorial Levels, a federal government–developed 
companion document to the NIPP, may explain the federal government’s failure to 
mandate specific steps. The cover letter explains that the guide was not intended to be 
“prescriptive”; rather, it was intended to “suggest various strategies and approaches”98s 
and leave it to the state or local government’s discretion as to whether or which 
suggestions to incorporate into their state CIP plan. That same sentiment may be a 
common influence on other federal guidance. 
In 2003, the Council of State Governments released the State Official’s Guide to 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, with broadly identified objectives for a state protection 
program. The guide recommended that states focus on coordination, communication, and 
information sharing; develop partnerships with the federal government, other states, and 
the private sector; conduct scenario-based exercises; and conduct vulnerability and risk 
assessments of identified critical assets.99 The guide establishes that national 
preparedness and response is also an important element of the overall protection effort. 
The guide also lacked definitive guidance. The lack of specific guidance creates a gap 
where states must educate themselves about CIKR protection and determine how they 
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can best achieve NIPP-stated goals. Absent prescriptive and definitive guidance, it is 
incumbent upon a state to provide the specific protection roles to be executed within its 
jurisdiction. 
In that light the following chapter will review the possible implementation steps 
for state government to fulfill its CIP mission. There is an abundance of potential tactical 
and strategic critical infrastructure protection roles that a state government may 
undertake. In this chapter those roles will be culled from the 2009 NIPP, the DHS-
developed Guide to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection at the State, 
Regional, Local, Tribal and Territorial Levels, and the state infrastructure protection 
strategies of the states of Arizona, Washington, and Virginia. Each of the five documents 
was evaluated and cross-referenced to determine consensus and divergence regarding the 
roles for a state government in CIP. Based on that analysis and my professional 
experience working in infrastructure protection, recommendations will be offered 
regarding actions that merit inclusion in the CIKR protection strategy of Massachusetts. 
In the context of the national infrastructure protection effort, it is important for a 
state government to understand its strategic role in order to maximize its contribution and 
insure a return on its investment of resources. In an undertaking the size and complexity 
of infrastructure protection, unity and synergy of effort is important at every level. As 
with each of the entities involved in CIKR protection (federal, state, and private sector), 
state governments must coordinate their efforts with the federal government and private 
industry to avoid duplication of effort and to focus their resources in the most 
advantageous area. 
This chapter will utilize the six stages of the Risk Management Framework 
suggested in the 2009 NIPP as a format to analyze the state roles recommended in the 
NIPP and to evaluate the recommendations. The NIPP recommends both tactical and 
strategic steps. The chapter will identify which of the suggested roles are tactical in 
nature and recommend how a state can develop and coordinate the capacity to achieve the 
tactical objectives. The chapter will further address the strategic roles with the objective 
of recommending how the state of Massachusetts can achieve a strategic CIP impact on 
behalf of its residents and the nation. 
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A. THE TACTICAL ROLES OF STATE GOVERNMENT 
The NIPP suggests that CIP efforts can include the following wide range of 
activities: 
• Improving security protocols; 
• Hardening facilities; 
• Building resiliency and redundancy; 
• Incorporating hazard resistance into facility design; 
• Initiating active or passive countermeasures; 
• Installing security systems; 
• Leveraging self-healing technologies; 
• Promoting workforce surety programs; 
• Implementing cyber security measures; 
• Conducting training exercises; and 
• Planning for business continuity.100  
From the perspective of state government, the majority of these actions are 
tactical and generally appropriate to address the security vulnerabilities of individual 
assets or groups of assets. If applied effectively, the actions reduce the vulnerability of 
specific assets to a postulated threat; they are appropriate recommendations to public or 
private CIKR asset owners. However, although many of these steps are relatively simple 
to implement, they may not always be appropriate or represent the best solution to 
vulnerability. For example, some infrastructure by its nature may not be targeted by 
terrorists. In such a case hardening facilities, installing security systems, or initiating 
active or passive countermeasures may not be necessary.  
The CIP practitioner requires a level of knowledge, skill, and experience in CIKR 
protection in order to make recommendations that are relevant and that effectively 
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mitigate the postulated threat. A poor-quality effort from a state vulnerability assessment 
team that recommends physical-security solutions where there is no threat only provides 
bad data, undermines the credibility of their findings and recommendations, and may lead 
to wasted security resources and diminished rapport among the CIKR partners. 
Understanding the realistic threat and the risk to infrastructure sectors and their assets is 
critically important to conducting relevant vulnerability assessments. In the aftermath of 
9/11, without a clear understanding of the threat to our nation’s infrastructure, 
inexperienced CIP practitioners caused unnecessary investments to be made in physical 
security, wasting financial and emotional capital for public and private-sector 
infrastructure operators. 
For the most part the actions listed above, where incorrectly applied and 
implemented, do not achieve a strategic effect. They do not create a result where the 
effort expended to execute the action achieves an effect many times greater than the 
effort expended. The goal of the state CIP practitioner is to apply an appropriate blend of 
tactical actions in areas that are identified through intelligence analysis as being likely 
targets of attack or other damage and that through risk analysis present significant 
vulnerabilities warranting the investment of resources to achieve a strategic security 
posture. 
The strategic application of resources is easier said than done. Although a 
challenge, it can be achieved by dedicated, experienced, and educated CIP professionals. 
The leader of a state’s CIP program needs to perform like the Leonard Bernstein of 
critical infrastructure protection. To expand the metaphor, the CIP leader must 
understand CIKR and perform like the brilliant maestro of an orchestra, who 
synchronizes the professional musicians, in this case CIP partners from both the public 
and private sector. The score for the CIKR symphony would be the state infrastructure 
protection strategy.  
Virginia’s Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resiliency Strategic Plan supports 
this maestro-like metaphor when it directs that its Office of Commonwealth Preparedness 
(OCP) “will lead in the development of Vulnerability Assessment Teams, whose 
members will be subject matter experts drawn from State, Local and Private Sector 
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entities. The Vulnerability Assessment Teams will support all Sector Specific Agencies 
in developing their Sector Specific Plans.”101 Virginia has identified an appropriately 
high-level state entity, the OCP, to “conduct” its CIP effort with well-qualified subject 
matter experts at its direction. That portion of its strategic plan recognizes the need to 
oversee the state CIP effort from a prominent position in state government resourced with 
experts. Making that statement a reality will achieve a strategic impact for the state. The 
following will address more strategic roles for a state.  
B. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENT 
Prior to the 2009 NIPP, much of federal infrastructure protection guidance 
addressed “protecting” infrastructure. The term “protection” was widely used in previous 
federal guidance and remained a nebulous term. The established federal narrative of 
“protecting” critical infrastructure evoked the perception that CIKR sectors or assets must 
be secured from the threat of terrorist attack and remain safely operational 100 percent of 
the time. Assets that are 100 percent secure or safe is an unrealistic goal in an open and 
free society. A distorted perspective of the actual risk that CIKR faced warranted a 
national reframing of the CIKR protection narrative away from a predominantly focus on 
terrorism to a broader understanding of managing the greatest risk. As government 
infrastructure protection practitioners learned more about the challenges of “protecting” 
single CIKR assets, they also better appreciated the need to focus more efforts on 
managing risk across a sector. The 2009 NIPP evolved to focus more on risk than 
previous federal strategies had, explaining that the protection effort “includes actions to 
mitigate the overall risk to CIKR assets, systems, networks, functions, or their 
interconnecting links resulting from exposure, injury, destruction, incapacitation, or 
exploitation.”102 
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The 2009 NIPP incorporated the Risk Management Framework as the foundation 
for the most recent federal CIP effort. The Risk Management Framework is composed of 
six core functions that DHS recommends that a state critical infrastructure protection 
program fulfill. The six steps are identified as:  
• Set goals and objectives; 
• Identify assets, systems, and networks; 
• Assess risk; 
• Prioritize CIKR across sectors; 
• Implement protective programs and resiliency strategies; and 
• Measure the effectiveness of the risk mitigation efforts.103 
Figure 3 depicts the six steps of the federal risk management cycle, as well as the 
three broad threat sources (physical, cyber, and human) from which to evaluate the risk to 
CIKR. 
 
Figure 3.   Risk Management Framework (from NIPP, 2009) 
We will now review the six steps of the Risk Management Framework as they are 
addressed in the NIPP and review the three state CIP strategies to ascertain how they 
intend to fulfill those six steps. 
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1. Set Goals and Objectives 
In a strategy the goals and objectives define the intent of the plan and provide 
focus for the effort. The NIPP explains that “goals and objectives define specific 
outcomes; conditions, end points, or performance targets that collectively constitute an 
effective risk management posture.”104 It further establishes the overarching goal of the 
national CIP effort: “Nationally the overall goal of CIKR-related risk management is an 
enhanced state of protection and resilience achieved through the implementation of 
focused risk-reduction strategies within and across sectors and levels of government.”105 
Each state has been left to determine how it will focus its resources to achieve CIKR 
protection through risk reduction. The goals evident in each of the three state critical 
infrastructure plans analyzed strike me as too broad and as having been written for 
political rhetoric more than to define the parameters of the plan and to give appropriate 
direction. 
For example, the Arizona plan, which was written in 2006, before the current 
NIPP was released, does not seem to be synchronized with current federal CIKR 
protection goals. The Arizona plan establishes three goals: 1) to ensure that first 
responders have access to personal protective equipment; 2) to improve communication 
systems to allow first responders to communicate during emergencies; and 3) to bolster 
security in the state.106 The stated goals in the context of the plan do not seem to be 
relevant to coordinating the state effort with the federal CIKR protection effort. The goals 
seem intended to bolster the intent of justifying federal money to achieve a state desire to 
fund the purchase of emergency management equipment. The third goal to bolster state 
security is so broad as to be meaningless as a mechanism to provide direction for the CIP 
effort. 
Alternatively, the overarching goal of Virginia’s critical infrastructure protection 
plan is “to ensure a Virginia whose communities, businesses and government are safe, 
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secure and prepared.” That is a broad goal that provides context to the effort. This broad 
goal is then more keenly focused through seven supporting goals that synchronize that 
plan with the NIPP:  
• Identification and protection of CIKR deemed most critical; 
• Timely warning for CIKR facing a specific, imminent threat; 
• Enabling a collaborative environment with government and the private 
sector; 
• Ensuring that sufficient funding is available to mitigate CIKR risks; 
• Integrating the Virginia plan with the NIPP; 
• Understanding, protecting, and sharing information about terrorist threats 
and other hazards; and 
• Building security partnerships for long term risk management.107 
Each of the supporting goals orient the state’s CIP partners to the objectives they 
should strive to achieve. 
Interestingly, the Washington State Infrastructure Protection Plan (WIPP) does 
not directly state the plan’s goals. Rather, it explains the purpose of goals in general and 
references the Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategy as the source for the 
WIPP’s goals. The WIPP establishes that its public and private-sector protection partners 
are expected to adopt goals whose intent is “to maintain and sustain critical and essential 
services that support a normal way of life for the citizens of Washington State.”108 The 
Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategy identifies as the state’s CIKR goal to 
“Develop and Sustain an Infrastructure Protection Program.”109 Its homeland security 
strategy states that the Washington Military Department, Emergency Management 
Division will lead the statewide CIP effort; it lists a series of supporting objectives to 
help achieve the statewide objective. The stated objective of the strategy generally 
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supports the goals addressed in the NIPP. The decision to assign the responsibility of 
overseeing the state CIP program to the state military department has value in that the 
military members have likely had experience protecting infrastructure, conducting 
vulnerability assessments, and organizing and executing complex strategies from their 
traditional military mission. Massachusetts could be well served to mirror the Virginia 
plan’s goals and objectives and to mandate the involvement of its National Guard 
resources. 
An integral component of the national CIKR protection effort is conducting asset 
inventory of the CIKR sectors in each state. The asset inventory is an important tactical-
level task for state governments to undertake that produces a strategic effect. The next 
step in the NIPP risk management cycle that we will evaluate is the process of identifying 
CIKR assets within the jurisdiction. 
2. Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks 
Before prioritizing what is and is not important, a state must identify the 
infrastructure and supporting assets in its jurisdiction. The DHS intends to leverage the 
state and local government relationships with private-sector CIKR owners so that those 
entities will perform a significant portion of the national CIKR inventory data collection. 
A web-based tool, Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System 
(C/ACAMS), was created to facilitate state, local, and private-sector entities’ input of 
CIKR data into the federal database.110 The actual inventory of infrastructure in a state is 
a tactical function from which the aggregate of the collected data should create strategic 
understanding. Once the inventory is compiled, the stratification of critical from 
noncritical begins. 
With an amorphous national CIKR definition, the list of assets that potentially 
qualify as critical infrastructure in any given state grows. Inventorying assets and 
identifying those assets that qualify as critical based on current federal guidance and 
practice is a daunting challenge. Establishing criteria for stratifying the importance or 
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criticality of infrastructure and its commensurate assets is a necessary component of 
infrastructure protection. States should enjoin the federal government to reframe the 
national CIKR narrative to help practitioners understand that all infrastructure is not 
“critical” and to establish a clear distinction between basic infrastructure and “critical” 
infrastructure. A state strategic plan needs to focus the predominate effort on ensuring the 
protection and functioning of “critical” infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, in the national CIKR arena, the definition of “critical” is lacking. 
Dr. Bellavita makes an important point that “the initial difference between critical 
infrastructure and plain vanilla infrastructure seems to have quietly vanished.”111 Today 
almost everything related to infrastructure assumes some level of criticality. As noted in 
an issue of the Heritage Foundation’s Backgrounder, the term “criticality” is overused. 
The article describes the following condition: “Policymakers, uncomfortable about 
acknowledging that not all attacks or accidents can be prevented, turn to criticality as a 
crutch—pouring more and more resources into all infrastructure instead of tailoring 
dollars to those that are truly critical. Essentially, there is an incentive to deem 
infrastructure critical because of the resources that become available from such a 
designation.”112 
Both points strike at a significant element, albeit an unnecessary one, that 
dramatically complicates an already complex issue. From my research it appears that the 
lack of understanding by many involved in infrastructure protection has fostered the 
expansion of the term “critical.” The fact that federal grant dollars are tied to protecting 
infrastructure creates an incentive for politicians and CIP practitioners to term assets as 
critical in order to qualify for protection funds. It will take a very strong hand to end this 
misdirected effort and force CIP practitioners, public and private, to better understand 
and more accurately qualify what infrastructure is truly critical. That simple “criticality” 
discriminator will filter out the unimportant and enable states to focus diminished 
resources on the important. The Backgrounder article suggests that practitioners 
“disaggregate what is ‘critical’ (essential for sustaining and supporting Americans’ daily 
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lives) from what is ‘dangerous’ (e.g., chemical facilities) but not necessarily critical.”113 
To establish the most functional list of true CIKR, political influence must be eliminated. 
A review of the recent evolution of the definition of “critical infrastructure” as it 
has evolved across federal directives, from the release of the Patriot Act in 2001, the 
Homeland Security Act in 2002, HSDP-7 in 2003, and other homeland security 
strategies, including the most current definition in the 2009 NIPP, may enlighten the 
issue. The 2009 NIPP standard CIKR definition is “systems and assets, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital that the incapacity or destruction of such may have a debilitating 
impact on the security, economy, public health or safety, environment, or any 
combination of these matters, across any federal, state, regional or local jurisdiction.”114 
The federal definition of “critical” infrastructure is significantly broad to avoid creating a 
definition that unintentionally excludes an asset. That is understandable when considering 
that the federal definition will be applied across this great and expansive nation. 
Unfortunately, the NIPP’s broad definition of critical infrastructure or very close 
derivatives of it are regularly repeated in state homeland security strategies. The broad 
definition has the effect of disbursing the CIP practitioner’s focus to all infrastructure 
assets. Despite the lack of a clear federal definition of “critical,” each state is free to 
create a more definitive description of what constitutes “critical” infrastructure within 
that state, and it should do so. 
Without a refined definition of “critical,” there is an ever-expanding inventory of 
CIKR maintained in the federal infrastructure data warehouse (IDW), with contributions 
from the DHS, Sector Specific Agencies (SSA), state governments, and the private-sector 
owners of CIKR. In order to stratify the inventory data, the DHS created the National 
CIKR Prioritization Program, which qualifies CIKR that has national significance as 
either Tier 1 or Tier 2 assets. The criteria for both Tier 1 and 2 assets are described as 
those that, “if destroyed or disrupted, could cause some combination of significant 
casualties, major economic losses, or widespread and long-term disruptions to national 
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well-being and governance capacity.”115 The federal government, through the DHS and 
the SSAs, maintains primary responsibility for maintaining the inventory of Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 assets. 
However, Tier 1 and 2 assets fall within the jurisdiction of state governments, 
who have a responsibility to protect those assets. Protection of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 
CIKR falls under the federal Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP). The BZPP is the 
responsibility of the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection, PSAs, and FEMA. In each 
state after Tier 1 and Tier 2 assets are identified a state should begin to stratify and 
prioritize the remaining critical assets in its jurisdiction by their importance to the state. 
Insuring that those assets deliver their commensurate services will be the responsibility of 
a given state and its private-sector partners. In order to prioritize the attention given to 
infrastructure in a state, whether through physical-security investment, enhanced 
operational or security processes or enhanced resiliency, the risk to a given asset or CIKR 
sector must be assessed. Correctly assessing risk to a sector and the assets within that 
sector will have strategic effects by influencing decisions about how to best insure that a 
sector delivers its service. Risk assessment is another contentious issue in CIP and will be 
analyzed next. 
3. Assess Risk 
Risk assessment methodology has been a contentious issue in homeland security 
since 2001. In the period of time since 2001, the DHS has introduced a number of risk 
formulas to be utilized by states to calculate risk to infrastructure. Application of those 
risk formulas created contention centered on the outcome of risk assessments conducted 
by the states. The outcome of those state risk assessments determined the amount of 
federal homeland security grant dollars received by that state. Politics seems to have 
influenced the risk methodology selected by the federal government. An analysis 
conducted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) regarding the risk methodology 
formulas selected by the federal government illuminates the history of risk assessment 
problems and discusses the strength of the current methodology.  
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The evolution of the federal risk assessment methodologies affords some insight 
for the CIP practitioner to appreciate that there are different methodologies and that a 
given methodology may affect the outcome of the analysis. Immediately after September 
11, 2001, through FY 2003, the federal formula for calculating risk was as simple as “risk 
= population (R=P).”116 This formula essentially means that the population of a region 
drives the degree of risk to that region. This was an extremely rudimentary formula that 
did not facilitate stratification of CIKR based upon risk. Considering the simplicity of the 
formula, it seemed to be more oriented toward spreading federal dollars to pacify 
politicians than toward effectively identifying which critical infrastructure was most at 
risk and allocating protection dollars for protection efforts to mitigate the risk. The 
following year, in 2004 to 2005, the DHS risk calculation formula was altered to factor 
population density (PD), threat (T), and critical infrastructure (CI) where risk 
R=T+CI+PD. 
During the reign of Michael Chertoff as secretary of the DHS, in 2006, the next 
change to the federal risk methodology coincided with the secretary’s directive that risk 
management would underscore the department’s calculus for the dispersal of grant funds. 
Under Chertoff the DHS risk formula was R=T*V*C. “This new approach to allocating 
the remaining funds required an assessment of risk using a formula that considers the 
threat to a target/area, multiplied by vulnerability (V) of the target/area, multiplied by 
consequence (C) of an attack on that target/area.”117 Multiplication of the factors of risk 
gave each factor a weighted value, allowing for stratification of risk among CIKR assets 
within a sector and also across CIKR sectors. 
To compare the levels of risk to CIKR assets and sectors across the spectrum of 
CIKR sectors, it is necessary to establish a common baseline by utilizing a single formula 
for all calculations of risk. Unfortunately, the realistic application of risk theory across all 
postulated threats does not lend itself to a clean analysis process. There is still a great  
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degree of subjectivity introduced into the calculation with respect to an asset’s 
vulnerability to a threat. The DHS therefore decided to assign a value of one for 
vulnerability to eliminate it as a variable. 
The 2009 NIPP has established the latest risk formula to be R=f(C,V,T), where 
risk is considered to be a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat. The DHS 
considers it to be important that its partner in the national CIP effort understand risk to be 
influenced by the nature and magnitude of the threat, the vulnerabilities to that postulated 
threat, and the consequences that could result.118  
 
Figure 4.   DHS FY 2007 Risk Formula (from Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, “Risk 
Assessment Methodology, 8) 
A study conducted by the National Research Council, available in the National 
Academies, stated that the “Committee finds that current Department of Homeland 
Security risk formula of Risk=f(T,V,C) is a philosophically suitable framework for 
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breaking risk into its component elements.”119 The premise of the analysis was 
essentially that the formula works conceptually to calculate risk from natural and man-
made hazards, but it questioned the formula’s ability to calculate risk in the “terrorism 
domain.”120 The DHS established a requirement that its adopted risk analysis formula 
meet four objectives: being documented, reproducible, defensible, and complete. The 
study found that the DHS’s historical application of the formula did not meet the four 
required objectives.121 That determination certainly brings into question the validity of 
the risk assessments conducted by DHS and its agents to date. 
There are many challenges to managing the risk analysis component of the CIKR 
protection mission. The study in the National Academies Press questions the DHS’s 
capacity to consistently produce accurate and effective risk analysis due to the limitation 
of available, experienced, and qualified risk analysis personnel to work on behalf of the 
DHS. This is an important factor for states that will need to rely on the risk analysis 
capacity of the DHS to support their own needs. The education level and depth of 
experience required for an analyst to develop a qualified opinion of the state of risk 
within a given sector makes it unlikely that every state could maintain a team of 
individuals dedicated to risk analysis. State CIP team members will require formal 
training in risk analysis in order to apply the appropriate risk modeling tools with 
credibility. 
The state of Arizona’s CIP strategy does not specify the risk formula used, but it 
does recognize risk as a factor of consequence, vulnerability, and threat. The strategy 
discusses the development of a statewide risk assessment. To provide a context for 
understanding risk to CIKR, Arizona elected to address consequence analysis in four 
categories: 
• Health impact—Effect on human life and physical well-being; 
• Economic impact—Direct and indirect effects on the economy; 
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• Psychological impact—Effect on the public’s morale and confidence in 
national economic and political institutions; and 
• Governance impact—Effect on the government’s ability to maintain order, 
deliver minimum essential services, ensure the public’s health and safety, 
and carry out national security related missions.122 
As discussed earlier, insurance companies analyze risk utilizing historical data to 
establish the likelihood of an event’s occurrence or recurrence. Through historical data 
they are able to calculate the degree of risk of an event’s happening and to calculate the 
potential loss from a particular threat. With respect to current critical infrastructure 
protection doctrine, risk must be calculated for the threat presented from Mother Nature’s 
wrath, man-made accidents, and now the threat of terrorism. The terrorist threat is 
difficult to determine, and without an extensive terrorism actuarial table, it is difficult to 
predict the degree of risk from terrorism. Without precise intelligence it is difficult to 
predict the likelihood of a specific type of terrorist event occurring at a specific location 
in order to calculate the consequence of that event to that asset or infrastructure sector.  
Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination in the context of information 
sharing is necessary to facilitate the ability of CIKR partners to measure the threat picture 
for their jurisdiction. Creating and maintaining effective information sharing processes 
has been a work in progress for fusion centers. Appropriate information sharing remains 
an integral component of accurately calculating threat. The NIPP information sharing 
solution lies in the development of trusting relationships, partnerships, and coordination 
across federal, state, and local government, as well as private-sector CIKR owners. 
Figure 5 is a visual model of the NIPP information sharing concept. 
Calculating a sector’s or region’s level of risk is an important first step toward 
prioritizing an appropriate vulnerability mitigation plan for a specific asset or whole 
sector. The following section will address how a state should prioritize CIKR and its 
response to calculated risk. 
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Figure 5.   NIPP Networked Information Sharing Approach (from NIPP, 2009, 60) 
4. Prioritize Critical Infrastructure Across Sectors 
The complexity and expanse of CIKR in an interdependent society challenges the 
resources available to secure the full infrastructure spectrum. Presumably, not every 
sector is equally important to the functioning of a modern society, and not all assets 
within a CIKR sector are equally important within that sector. From the perspective of a 
given jurisdiction responsible for securing infrastructure, economy of forces becomes 
critical. Maximizing the available resources to assure that infrastructure delivers its 
service to maintain a functioning society requires an accurate selection of the most 
critical assets within each system and across CIKR sectors. Prioritizing which 
infrastructure sector is more important to society over another and which asset within a 
sector is more important can become contentious when opinions and priorities are not in 
sync. 
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The breadth and magnitude of the CIKR sectors can be an overwhelming concern 
to those tasked to protect them. The fact that there are sector-specific agencies at the 
federal level with assigned responsibilities to coordinate securing each of the CIKR 
sectors does little to diminish the concern of the state practitioners tasked at the ground 
level to secure them. The federal sector-specific agencies can be a resource to state 
government to help navigate the spectrum of CIKR when prioritizing its effort to secure 
CIKR sectors or assets. In order to facilitate the state-level management of CIP, the 
commonwealth of Virginia established a state-level sector-specific council (SSC), 
responsible to the Office of Commonwealth Preparedness (OCP); it dictated that each of 
those agencies insure that the risk management framework is followed.123 Tasking 
sector-specific agencies at the state level achieves a strategic effect by parceling 
responsibility across multiple agencies, thereby freeing the OCP to coordinate and guide 
the overall CIP effort. Each Virginia SSC is able to focus more intensely on the issues 
concerning infrastructure in its sector and to understand how to prioritize that sector’s 
needs. 
Federal guidance within the 2009 NIPP recommends that, in order to prioritize 
CIKR, a jurisdiction should compile and compare risk assessments to gain situational 
understanding of each of its sector’s individual risk. After aggregating the assessment, it 
should be able to establish priorities based on risk and create “protection, resilience or 
business continuity initiatives that provide the greatest return on investment for the 
mitigation of risk.”124 However, ensuring a corporate regard for securing CIKR among 
all parties with a vested interest in CIKR is a challenge. Gaining mutual understanding of 
an asset’s importance or criticality and then agreeing to the stratification of an asset 
against other critical assets may be contentious. Appreciating which components or assets 
truly merit protection and then understanding the degree of protection that an asset 
warrants is an essential component of the overall state protection effort. An important 
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consideration in this effort is a tenet of Sun Tzu: to defend (protect) everything is to 
defend (protect) nothing.125 How, then, is the final prioritization of CIKR accomplished? 
The NIPP guidance suggests that CIKR prioritization includes determining which 
“regions, sectors, or other aggregation of CIKR assets, systems or networks have the 
highest risk from relevant incidents or events.” Those that face the greatest potential loss 
will receive the greatest attention in developing risk management solutions. The second 
step is to determine, of those assets prioritized to receive risk management assistance, 
which will likely realize the greatest risk mitigation for the investment. In this regard 
much of the NIPP guidance remains general and ambiguous, subject to interpretation and 
adherence to prioritization seemingly at a given state’s will.  
The state of Arizona establishes that its state government “will identify, prioritize 
and coordinate protection of critical infrastructure and key resource” but does not identify 
how prioritization will be calculated.126 Virginia also accepts responsibility through its 
Office of Commonwealth Preparedness (OCP) to prioritize the protection of CIKR by 
leveraging its state sector-specific councils to conduct the prioritization and protective 
efforts.127 Similarly, Washington State utilizes the Infrastructure Protection Sub 
Committee (IPSC) to prioritize “CIKR having statewide or broader impact.” 128 
Additionally, the state of Washington provides a general explanation of how that 
prioritization will be achieved by factoring notional outcomes to terrorism, natural 
disaster, and emergency scenarios. 
a. The Important Versus the Unimportant 
The basis for the contention created during efforts to prioritize CIKR 
within a given jurisdiction can be summed up in the expression “One man’s trash is 
another man’s treasure.” Invariably, there will be varying degrees of consensus as to 
which CIKR asset is figuratively considered to be trash as opposed to treasure. 
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With respect to public policy, when prioritizing an asset based on its 
perceived criticality, the relevance of a CIKR asset may become defined somewhat in the 
context of “where one sits often dictates where one stands” on the issue. In that light 
there are generally different opinions about what is important from the different 
perspectives of federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Politics, whether federal, state or 
local, can certainly be a factor that will influence which assets make the criticality list and 
where those assets rank in importance for protection dollars. Presumably, the higher 
degree of criticality that a sector or an asset rates; the greater the resources that society 
expends to secure it. 
Absent politics infrastructure prioritization differences of opinion may 
exist simply because of an individual’s vocation in life or location in life. For example, a 
small-town mayor may believe that her town hall is a critical asset to the community’s 
well-being and that it should receive protection dollars. However, that town hall has 
absolutely no relevance to the overall nation’s well-being and it is therefore unimportant 
from a federal perspective. Now, of course, this example is absurd and simplifies the 
issue to make a point that there may be dramatic differences of opinion about what is 
critical. Also, priorities will change over time as society’s needs change. Once again, a 
clear definition of what is critical infrastructure, including examples, will ease the CIP 
process.  
b. National, Regional, State and Local Perspective 
Prioritizing CIKR assets may be a contentious process even within a local 
community. By extension the stratification process of CIKR at the national level must be 
even more so. The national-level stratification is the concern of the federal government, 
but that national process will undoubtedly affect many state and local communities where 
different CIKR assets are located. As an example, consider that a critical node of the 
communication sector is located in a community that is unaware of that asset’s function 
and critical importance. That single building could link numerous components of that 
sector or be a single point of failure for a region of the country. The loss of that node 
could lead to an instant loss of the network. Under certain threat conditions a local 
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jurisdiction could be responsible for securing that asset. With respect to this notional 
communication asset, the local and state jurisdiction where that asset is located should 
have a say in how that asset is stratified and regarded at the national level. They should 
be involved in the asset’s vulnerability assessment and in the discussion of how to 
prioritize that asset. 
On the other hand, it is possible that a CIKR asset is located in a local 
jurisdiction where the locals are aware of the asset’s importance to an infrastructure 
sector or that it is a critical node that links multiple sectors together but the federal or 
state government is unaware. Coordination and effective communication across all 
entities with a potential interest in an asset’s welfare is necessary to ensure that all levels 
of government are aware of an asset’s importance and that they establish who will protect 
that asset. The previous discussion underscores the importance of effective public and 
private partnerships. 
5. Implement Programs 
In the area of homeland security, it is frequently said that 85 percent of this 
country’s infrastructure is owned by the private sector. Accepting the accuracy of this 
statement raises a significant issue for federal and state governments about how to ensure 
that the CIKR that is owned and controlled by the private sector remains viable to deliver 
the service or goods that this country requires to sustain our way of life. What mechanism 
can the government use to ensure that the private owner of CIKR assets takes the 
reasonable measures to protect critical assets from damage? Should the government 
establish regulations and enforce standards of protection for an infrastructure sector? Or 
is the solution to allow the private-sector owners the freedom to establish an industry 
standard for security and hope that market competition will create pressure on the owners 
to effectively secure their assets in order to remain competitive within that sector? This 
issue was debated by the Marsh Commission. The findings of the commission can be 
found woven throughout much of the federal strategy to protect infrastructure. As 
explained by General Robert Marsh regarding the commission’s debate on these issues,  
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As one would expect, there was lively debate regarding the many possible 
options. They ranged from government-centric solutions involving 
legislation and regulation prescribing mandatory remedial actions by 
industry and government, to the opposite extreme of voluntary actions 
prompted by political leaders’ urgings through stressing patriotic duty and 
the national interest. After much deliberation we concluded that the 
private sector has a clear responsibility to protect itself from the lesser 
threats, such as individual hackers and criminals, and the government has 
the larger responsibility to protect the citizens from national security 
threats.129 
A general understanding of the Marsh Commission’s report and findings will 
greatly enhance the aptitude of any practitioner of critical infrastructure protection. Their 
findings, if accepted, will help determine the nature and focus of a state CIP program 
with respect to the roles played by government and the roles played by the private sector. 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to this problem. In his thesis Gregory M. 
Jaksec writes about the benefits of government regulation as a mechanism to ensure that 
infrastructure sectors meet operation standards. Jaksec refers to the federal regulations 
imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on the energy sector as 
an example of the government’s involvement to ensure delivery services.130 Of course, 
excessive government regulation of a sector could thwart its ability to remain competitive 
in the market place. To insure CIKR delivery of services, Jaksec proposes a blend of 
solutions to include public-private partnerships and government-supported incentive 
packages that include security standards, insurance underwriting, and tax incentives. 131  
We will consider next the private-sector and public-sector involvement in a state 
CIP program. 
a. Private Sector 
Federal strategies including the 2009 NIPP identify the need for 
government entities to include and rely upon the private sector in the CIKR assurance 
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efforts. The ongoing recovery efforts unfolding in the Gulf of Mexico today with respect 
to British Petroleum’s handling of its runaway oil well spill and the allegations of unsafe 
oil rig operations leading to the spill bring into question the wisdom of relying wholly on 
private industry to manage any infrastructure sector owned by it. An article in Business 
Week lays out some of BP’s history of safety transgressions surrounding oil production 
that may have been contributing factors in the Deepwater Horizon disaster. The article 
also identifies BP CEO Tony Hayward’s admission that the company wasn’t prepared to 
manage a spill of this magnitude. 132 If true, it would appear that BP could not be trusted 
to insure a safe and reliable delivery of petroleum products. But is the BP example 
isolated, a statistic aberration when factored across all the private industry-run 
infrastructures effectively operated over the years? 
Consider another example: in Massachusetts a series of significant storms 
over the last few years has undermined public confidence in the state’s major power 
company’s ability to ensure the delivery of power or to quickly recover after a significant 
disruption. A significant ice storm, a rare Category 1–2 hurricane, and a mid-fall 
Nor’easter each caused limbs from trees and whole trees to break in much greater 
numbers. Regions lost power and for longer periods of time due to the extensive damage 
to power lines from the broken trees. What appears to be the underlying factor for the 
extensive loss of power and the prolonged outage was the power company’s decision not 
to spend resources to better maintain vegetation-clear areas around the power lines.133 In 
contrast, towns that received electricity from municipal power companies had less 
extensive loss of power and recovered from the loss more quickly than the privately 
owned “big” power companies. Why? The municipal power companies had invested time 
and resources to better maintain the areas around their power lines.134 A government 
requirement to better maintain the power line rights of way may diminish the extent of 
damage from the effects of Mother Nature. However, government regulation of all CIKR 
                                                 
132 Barrett and Blum, “Oil Spill.” 
133 “Keller at Large: How to Fix Routine Power Outage Issues,” CBS Boston, October 31, 2011. 
Retrieved November 3, 2011, from http://boston.cbslocal.com/2011/10/31/keller-large-how-to-fix-routine-
power-outage-issues/. 
134 Pfeiffer and Jolicoeur, “Local Power Utilities.” 
 92
sectors would create bureaucratic nightmares for the government to manage and would 
risk undermining the private sector’s inherent capacity for flexible adaptation and 
improvement. 
From the perspective of a state CIP program, the debate regarding whether 
infrastructure should be owned and managed by private industry is beyond its concern. 
Based upon my experience in the critical infrastructure protection program in 
Massachusetts, the state lacks the capacity to operate and manage each of the 
infrastructure sectors’ industries. Private industry has the experience, knowledge, and 
resources to more effectively manage CIKR. To ensure the delivery of services, the 
reasonable alternative is for state government to establish a partnership with the private 
sector to effectively secure infrastructure. 
Developing a relationship of trust with the private sector infrastructure 
owners in your jurisdiction is strategically important. Creating partnerships with the 
private sector CIKR owners in a state’s jurisdiction is recommended in the 2009 NIPP 
and reiterated in numerous federal and state homeland security strategies, Congressional 
research, and academic research. Interestingly, the state of Alabama passed a law to 
ensure that cooperation and coordination among state, county, and local governments 
with private-sector CIKR owners is achieved.135 The private-industry owner of 
infrastructure needs to be regarded as an ally in the protection effort and relied upon to 
help the government practitioner understand the operation and vulnerabilities of the wide 
range of infrastructure sectors. 
b. Public Sector 
For the sake of clarification, infrastructure sectors that are predominantly 
controlled and operated by the public sector are: 
• Water supply and waste water treatment facilities; 
• Highways and roads; 
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• Public transportation, including rail service and airports managed by 
government agencies or government controlled authorities; 
• Emergency services inclusive of police, fire, and emergency management; 
and 
• Certain municipal electric power companies sprinkled throughout the 
country that generate power to support their region. 
Responsibility to protect those sectors rests entirely on state and local 
government. Those sectors at a minimum must be at the fore of state and local efforts to 
ensure the continued delivery of services and goods. Vulnerability assessments should be 
conducted to inventory the important assets and nodes supporting public transportation, 
water supply and waste water treatment, and municipal power systems. Of those sectors 
that are publicly operated we will look more closely at the aviation industry in order to 
highlight the state government’s role in that operation. For the majority of publicly 
owned U.S. airports, state government oversees management of the airport facilities and 
must provide security and law enforcement for the airport. 
Independent of other threats, the aviation industry is identified in open-
source reports as a principal and enduring target for al’ Qaeda–influenced terrorists. 
Consider the challenge of insuring the viability of the U.S. aviation industry with direct 
links to most countries around the globe. The Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) has the overall responsibility to insure the security of our aviation industry. In the 
air transportation realm, the TSA enforces security directives that mandate security 
requirements for the airport operator and for air carriers. Transportation security officers 
of the TSA are tasked to establish a layer of security at airports to screen passengers and 
cargo transported on the airplanes; the privately owned air carrier implements TSA-
required security procedures; and state or local government implements security 
programs to support TSA directives. The aviation industry is a good example of the value 
of a public-private partnership ensuring the viability of an infrastructure sector. Although 
those partnerships are not formally named, at public airports the safe and successful 
operation of the airport is one measure of an effective partnership.  
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The next challenge for state government in its CIP journey is to measure 
the effectiveness of its program. This next section will review the guidance from the 
NIPP and the three state CIP strategies. 
6. Measure Effectiveness 
The 2009 NIPP states, “The use of performance metrics is a critical step in the 
NIPP risk management process to enable DHS and the SSAs to objectively and 
quantitatively assess improvements in CIKR protection and resiliency at the sector and 
national levels.”136 All the recommended metrics measure what is being done but not 
how effective the tasks accomplished actually were. It is nice to know what was done, but 
that does not necessarily indicate whether the intended effect was achieved or whether it 
was necessary at all. 
The macro-level objective of DHS is to gauge whether the areas of CIKR deemed 
a priority for protection efforts are actually receiving the investment of attention and 
resources to mitigate any identified vulnerabilities. DHS is not objectively measuring 
whether the attention and investment in those prioritized sectors or assets are effectively 
securing those assets. The final measure should be that infrastructure continues to provide 
services whether the threat is from terrorism, Mother Nature, or poor engineering or 
process. 
An appropriate metric may be, for example, that service was delivered 
uninterrupted for so many days or that when a service was interrupted, it was returned to 
normal operation in a certain period of time. Based on my military and law enforcement 
experience with security, the measure of a security program’s effectiveness at preventing 
an attack is mostly subjective. The effectiveness of your program’s security from a 
terrorist threat cannot be measured by the irrationality that if you are attacked, your 
program is ineffective, and if you are not attacked, it is effective. There is also another 
possible measure of an effective program: if terrorists were detected in their planning 
cycle and their intended attack was thwarted. A number of terrorist-intended attacks like 
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the Ft. Dix plot or the Times Square bombing were stopped by an observant citizen who 
reported suspicious activity. Law enforcement or security officers did not directly stop 
the attack, and we cannot directly measure their effectiveness on stopping the attack. 
However, it could be argued that public outreach and education through a “See 
something, say something” type of initiative was effective.  
A review of the three state CIP plans with respect to measuring effectiveness 
revealed the following: The Arizona plan recognizes what metrics are generally intended 
to do but does not offer any information on the types of metrics to be used to measure the 
program’s effectiveness. The Virginia plan acknowledges its requirement to measure its 
program’s performance. The plan identifies the following four measures of success, 
generally stated as: 
• Coordinated, risk-based CIKR plans and programs in place addressing 
known and potential threats; 
• Flexible and adaptable structures and processes that adjust to lessons 
learned and best practices; 
• Processes established to identify and address dependencies and 
interdependencies; and 
• Access to intelligence, risk analysis, and real time incident reporting 
information sharing networks.137 
The Washington plan provides the most detail on how the state intends to measure 
effectiveness. The Washington plan states, “Measuring effectiveness is a continuum 
influenced by technology, threat, resources and numerous other factors.” The plan 
highlights resilience as the principle outcome if the program is effective. Washington 
identifies exercises as the most common tool to track effectiveness. The Washington plan 
identifies four mechanisms to measure effectiveness: 
• Descriptive measures—used to understand sector resources and activities 
with examples like the number of facilities in a jurisdiction or the 
population within the area of an incident; 
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• Process (output) measures—tracking the progress of a task, reporting the 
output of a process with examples such as the number of protective 
programs implemented in a fiscal year, the level of investment in those 
programs, the number of detection systems installed in a facility, or the 
number of employees receiving training; 
• Outcome measures—used to track progress toward a strategic goal by 
achieving results, rather than measuring the amount of activity. An 
example is measuring the reduction in risk for a given sector from one 
year to the next with a link to a specific protection process; and 
• Ensuring an effective, efficient program over the long term—identify 
gaps, implement solutions, and reevaluate effectiveness utilizing four 
questions each with subquestions with four ratings (did not meet; nearly 
met; met; and exceeded) to select as an answer to each question.138 
The Washington plan provides the most detail about measuring the effectiveness 
of the program. The measuring process forced the state to strongly critique the actions 
undertaken on behalf of the program.  
As demonstrated in this chapter, the state government’s role in critical 
infrastructure can be extensive. The following paragraph is taken in its entirety from the 
NIPP in order to make the point that a significant challenge is laid at the feet of state 
government: 
State and territorial governments shall develop and implement State or 
territory-wide CIKR protection programs that reflect the full range of 
NIPP-related activities. State and territorial programs should address all 
relevant aspects of CIKR protection, leverage support from homeland 
security assistance programs that apply across the homeland security 
mission area, and reflect priority activities in their strategies to ensure that 
resources are effectively allocated. Effective statewide and regional CIKR 
protection efforts should be integrated into the overarching homeland 
security program framework at the State or territorial level to ensure that 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts are synchronized 
and mutually supportive. CIKR protection at the State or territory level 
must cut across all sectors present within the State or territory and support 
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address unique geographical issues, including transborder concerns, as 
well as interdependencies among sectors and jurisdictions within those 
geographical boundaries.139 
The final chapter will offer recommendations from my research to incorporate 
into a state CIP program that will meet this challenge.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis serves to identify strategic roles that the state of Massachusetts should 
fulfill to effectively secure the delivery of infrastructure services within its jurisdiction. 
Review of federal critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) plans and strategies, 
other states’ CIKR protection plans or strategies, academic research, and other writings 
on the topic provide sufficient rationale to propose a state government role in critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP). This chapter presents the conclusions garnered from this 
research to provide a framework for an effective infrastructure assurance program and a 
CIKR assurance strategy for the state of Massachusetts. A successful infrastructure 
assurance program would require the following steps to be implemented: 
• Reframe the infrastructure protection narrative;  
• Develop resilience in infrastructure and the public; 
• Write a state CIKR protection strategy and develop an effective state CIP 
program;  
• Select an experienced, knowledgeable, and influential individual to lead 
the CIP effort;  
• Educate CIP practitioners, politicians, and the public; 
• Develop appropriate public-private partnerships and sector-specific 
councils; and  
• Create trust through transparent information sharing.  
A. REFRAME THE NARRATIVE 
1. Infrastructure Assurance 
The research for this topic followed various information trails leading to the first 
conclusion that in order to effectively manage the infrastructure issue in this country, and 
more parochially in the state of Massachusetts, it is necessary to reframe the CIKR 
protection narrative. The nation’s infrastructure narrative became focused on security of 
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infrastructure rather than assuring that infrastructure remain viable to deliver service. The 
first chapter of this thesis reviewed the recent history of infrastructure and the more 
recent history of the critical infrastructure protection debate. As evidenced, for example, 
in EO 13010140 and the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security,141 the 
infrastructure debate clearly became oriented toward a protection mission post–Desert 
Storm and focused even more acutely on critical infrastructure protection after the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11. The current narrative was further distorted since 9/11, when the 
spectrum of what qualifies as infrastructure that is “critical” began expanding within our 
current list of 18 CIKR sectors.  
The critical infrastructure protection initiative may be losing focus due to mission 
creep. As pointed out by Dr. Bellavita and others, what qualifies as “critical” is 
convoluted. The stratification of CIKR across 18 sectors is not the problem, but 
qualifying each sector as a critical infrastructure sector creates the perception that 
everything contained in each of those sectors is critical and warrants protection. That 
perception of broad criticality contributes to complicating the infrastructure debate 
simply by unnecessarily increasing the volume of data related to the discussion. A more 
definitive description of “critical” would help to improve understanding of what 
infrastructure is critical and help to segregate “vanilla” or normal infrastructure from 
“critical” infrastructure. 
The overarching infrastructure narrative should be oriented toward the assured 
delivery of services, rather than simply protecting CIKR. The goal of an infrastructure 
assurance strategy should be to provide targeted support to the infrastructure sectors, both 
from government and the private sector, so that quality services are delivered consistently 
and, if there is a disruption, that service is returned as quickly as practical. Services 
deemed critical would receive priority support toward assured delivery of service based 
upon a predefined ranking structure or process. To better focus the infrastructure 
assurance effort and rein in the critical infrastructure mission creep, it is necessary to 
better define what infrastructure is critical and what is normal. 
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To that end, within the state of Massachusetts infrastructure effort there should be 
two distinct categories of infrastructure: one “critical,” the other “normal.” Infrastructure 
deemed “critical” would qualify for regular maintenance support and prioritized 
protection effort, while the infrastructure deemed “normal” would qualify for the 
investment of resources oriented toward regular maintenance. During recovery operations 
in the aftermath of a significant man-made or natural disaster, infrastructure providing 
critical service would receive priority efforts to restore its associated service. Assurance 
of service requires the investment of capital and other resources in both types of 
infrastructure. Both types of infrastructure should be designed and operated with 
resilience in mind. Infrastructure resilience as a component of the state’s CIP strategy 
will be addressed in section B of this chapter. 
2. The New Critical 
An element of the complexity of infrastructure protection derives from the limited 
understanding of what constitutes critical infrastructure or when infrastructure becomes 
critical. The definition of critical infrastructure in the 2009 NIPP remains broad and open 
to interpretation. A loose interpretation of what is critical will have the effect of 
expanding the list of infrastructure assets requiring support. Absent specific federal 
government definitions, a state government can establish a functioning definition of 
critical to that state’s priority of effort assuring the delivery of service within the state. 
For example, a baseline definition of infrastructure that is critical might be an asset or 
network that, if damaged from a single, localized event, may either result in the 
immediate death of over 1,000 people, cause an immediate economic loss of more than 
$20 million, or result in the loss of service for greater than 14 days with a cumulative 
economic loss of over $100 million. The definition could be enhanced with examples of 
infrastructure that is critical, such as a certain capacity nuclear power plant, or a certain 
capacity hydroelectric dam, or a certain size chemical plant, or a node of a network such 
as electric, highway, pipeline, or cyber. 
An ambiguous definition of critical infrastructure also provides unnecessary 
opportunity for the government CIP practitioner or politician, wittingly or unwittingly, to 
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proclaim that an asset is critical in order to qualify for federal funds. A more exact 
definition would prevent the misapplication of resources toward assets that would not 
realize the greatest return for that investment. State politicians, state government CIP 
practitioners, and their private-sector partners should engage the DHS and the federal 
government in a CIKR debate to force a discussion to qualify what is critical. 
3. Understand the Threat 
Ten years after 9/11, the infrastructure protection debate also needs to be 
reframed in the context of better understanding the threats from which we are trying to 
secure infrastructure. The nature of the threat should directly affect the steps taken to 
secure CIKR or provide infrastructure assurance. Infrastructure is susceptible to damage 
from man-made or natural threats. History has shown examples of infrastructure 
catastrophically affected by man-made or natural events. However, other than war or 
significant natural disasters, few of those historical events have had a national or regional 
catastrophic impact. 
Avoiding catastrophe or responding to a catastrophe should be the primary 
government focus of the infrastructure assurance. In the context of threatening the 
stability of the United States, a country of over 300 million people spanning four time 
zones, a terrorist attack is not a catastrophic threat to the nation. Post 9/11, the nation 
focused on the postulated threat from terrorism. However, applying that threat to all 
infrastructure sectors and against each asset was not based in a realistic understanding of 
the threat.  
Experienced state CIP practitioners need to engage the DHS and challenge federal 
guidance that does not support the ground truth in their jurisdiction. Challenge the 
homeland security paradigm, specifically in the area of risk assessment and threat 
assessment. Avoid the current urge to cast the threat of terrorism as the greatest threat to 
all 18 sectors of infrastructure. The aviation and rail components of the transportation 
sector have certainly been the target of many terrorist attacks throughout the world and 
deserve the added security attention they receive especially because of the potential 
second- and third-order effects realized after successful attacks against those targets. 
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Excluding the attacks of 9/11, the direct result of the majority of terror attacks does not 
achieve the level of strategic effect that warrants the expenditure of resources applied by 
the United States across the many infrastructure sectors.  
a. Nation-State Threats? 
An accurate threat picture, be it an act of man or an act of nature, is 
necessary to conduct worthwhile risk assessments that drive infrastructure assurance 
decisions. It is not clear that many CIKR protection strategies and security investments 
were based on a clear appreciation of the threat or were made by people who had the 
experience to make qualified security decisions. Some of the local security solutions 
undertaken in the years since 9/11 seemed to be more appropriate to defend against a 
sustained attack from an enemy nation. Maybe that was the threat understood by some 
local decision makers. An attack by a nation-state is not the type of threat that most state 
politicians or law enforcement consider. If that threat is a part of the federal risk calculus, 
state politicians and heads of local law enforcement need to understand the context of the 
threat to engender their commitment of state and local resources to assist in securing 
assets in their jurisdiction worthy of protection. However, protecting against an attack 
from an unfriendly nation is mostly the realm of the federal government such as the DoD, 
DOS, or DHS. Enemy nation threats, unless imminent, should not be the daily concern of 
state CIP practitioners. State National Guard assets should be part of the state CIP 
program and more intimately involved with the DoD to understand nation-state threats to 
their state if they exist and to coordinate appropriate responses at the state level. State 
government’s focus should be focused on the more localized threats to infrastructure in 
its state, be it an act of man or an act of nature. 
b. Threats of Nature or Threats of Man  
At the state level, disruptions from nature are generally understood and 
predictable due to years of experience. Although extremes of nature are unpredictable, 
infrastructure assurance members need to consider the potential for a storm to strike with 
an intensity that greatly exceeds the norm. The ferocity and the subsequent compounded 
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effects from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 forced the federal government’s infrastructure 
protection effort to refocus on the threats from natural disaster as well as the threat of 
terrorism. Actions to mitigate the effects of the median threats from nature are already 
mitigated in building codes and formalized emergency response procedures. A state 
infrastructure assurance program would rely on local building inspectors to ensure that 
infrastructure is built to code so as to withstand extreme weather. Emergency response to 
local weather disruptions is mostly formalized and the primary concern of state and local 
emergency managers. Infrastructure assurance practitioners need to be sure that true 
“critical” infrastructure is able to withstand or recover quickly from the most extreme 
weather.  
On the other hand, man-made threats, especially from terrorism, are less 
understood and predictable. State CIP practitioners need to look to their state fusion 
center to gain a local understanding of the potential man-made threats in their region. In 
the event that the fusion center lacks the focus or capacity to provide valuable threat 
information, that information can be gained from the PSA assigned to that state or 
directly from HITRAC or the State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government 
Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC). It is important to understand that threat and risk 
analysis are products of human analysts and inherently contain a degree of subjectivity.  
State CIP practitioners should be informed and experienced in the 
spectrum of threats enough to challenge threat and risk assessments that do not comport 
with their understanding of the regional threat. The aggregate of localized threat should 
be contained in an annual risk assessment. A worthwhile risk assessment should provide 
a context to understand how a threat may make CIKR in the region vulnerable. 
The federal solution of creating resilience to mitigate the effects of either 
man-made or natural threats is encouraged through the 2009 NIPP. Resilience is the best 
alternative to mitigate the spectrum of predictable and unpredictable threats facing 
infrastructure. Planned infrastructure resilience will be discussed next as a state 
government’s response. 
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B. DEVELOP RESILIENCE IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC 
Planning resilience to threats of man or nature can be achieved in a number of 
ways, as discussed in Chapter IV. Infrastructure resilience can be achieved through 
building redundant capacity, such as back-up facilities to replace damaged buildings, or 
through effective management processes and procedures that avoid disasters or efficiently 
recover from them. Building redundancy through back-up buildings or through 
engineering more robust systems can be prohibitively expensive. Depending on the 
function of a given facility and its criticality to the infrastructure system, redundant 
capacity may not be warranted. In those cases developing and implementing strong 
processes and procedures may be the most cost effective and wise practice to achieve 
resilience. 
A hurricane, for example, has the potential to create regional devastation and 
indiscriminately disrupt assets located in its path. Yet within regions affected by 
hurricanes, there may be relatively very few infrastructure assets that will justify the 
advance investment in construction design engineering to help them withstand the force 
of a Class 4–5 hurricane. A region prone to hurricanes would better assure infrastructure 
services by preparing to effectively respond to and recover from the damage of a disaster. 
In the event of a hurricane, resilience built into the infrastructure systems in the form of 
redundant capacity, staff trained to respond and recover, partnerships trained and 
exercised to respond and recover, and a resilient population psychologically sound and 
ready to provide for themselves for a period of three to five days is necessary. 
A state CIP program should be involved in identifying the threats to its region; 
identifying the critical infrastructure in its jurisdiction worthy of investment in redundant 
capacity through risk analysis, and helping to guide the development and implementation 
of effective management processes to avoid or respond to infrastructure disruptions. The 
state infrastructure assurance program should also help emergency managers and private-




jurisdiction. State government has a role to enhance the resilience of its population by 
their resolve and the capacity to support themselves for short periods during an 
emergency. 
The state infrastructure assurance program can assist the federal government, state 
government, the private sector, and the public to develop the appropriate resiliency. 
There are many alternatives to develop a resiliency capacity in our society. An interesting 
example offered by Dr. Ted Lewis considers building “distributed generation” capacity 
into the power sector.142 Essentially, this idea entails creating the capacity to generate 
electricity at the local level, for example, at a mall, a factory, or in a neighborhood using 
solar, wind, and fuel cell generators. The localized power generation creates redundancy 
in the system and nearly eliminates one of the sector’s most vulnerable areas, the 
transmission and distribution of power.143 
Alternative power generation solutions, like that offered by Dr. Lewis, are key to 
the long-term success of the state infrastructure assurance effort. The involvement of 
academics pushing the creative envelope for solutions to our nation’s vexing 
infrastructure challenges is necessary to overcome government’s potential for 
bureaucratic inertia. Next, we will discuss the framework for an effective infrastructure 
assurance strategy and an infrastructure assurance program to implement the strategy, 
which will include formalized partnerships between government, the private sector, and 
academia.  
C. DEVELOP A STATE INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE STRATEGY 
AND AN EFFECTIVE INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 
1. Infrastructure Strategy 
At this time, Massachusetts is without a state CIKR protection strategy. The state 
should develop a strategy oriented toward a new concept of overall infrastructure 
assurance, including a more focused entity to address CIKR protection of assets that 
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warrant a greater level of support. To synergize with the federal CIKR effort, 
Massachusetts should develop a strategy that utilizes the NIPP risk management 
framework as a guideline similar to the strategies of Virginia and the state of 
Washington. State government roles should be articulated in a comprehensive 
infrastructure protection strategy that acknowledges the various efforts of public and 
private-sector partners and synchronizes those efforts toward insuring the delivery of 
infrastructure services in the jurisdiction. With respect to synchronizing partnerships, 
there are elements of the Virginia and Washington plans that bear inclusion in the 
Massachusetts strategy.  
For example, Virginia established the Governor’s Office of Commonwealth 
Preparedness (OCP). That state’s strategy establishes that the OCP was mandated by the 
General Assembly and state code to oversee the combined federal, state, and local 
officials and the private sector and state sector-specific agencies. The fact that the OCP is 
state legislated provides OCP with the leverage to orchestrate the state’s response. The 
strategic plan clearly establishes that the objective is to create “unity of results” and 
“unity of effort.” The Virginia plan organizes the effort by distributing responsibility to 
state-level sector-specific agencies, a VA Plan Coordinating Council, and other boards, 
commissions, councils, partnerships, and the state military advisory council.144 
Importantly, the Virginia plan also establishes a program goal with supporting goals.  
The state of Washington Infrastructure Protection Plan (WIPP) identifies its 
state’s concern about damage cascading through its infrastructure networks and 
propagating loss. The WIPP mirrors the risk management framework and guidance 
provided in the federal NIPP. The WIPP broadly addresses all hazard threats as opposed 
to focusing primarily on the threat of terrorism. The WIPP does not delineate goals for its 
plan but declares that their goals are located in the Washington Statewide Homeland 
Security Strategic Plan. One of the two goals in that plan is Goal 4.1: Develop and 
Sustain an Infrastructure Protection Program. The goal is supported by a series of well-
focused initiatives.145 The Washington strategy, similar to the Virginia strategy, creates 
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subcommittees, like the Committee on Homeland Security’s Infrastructure Protection 
Subcommittee (IPSC), populated with representatives from the state-level sector-specific 
councils that represent public-private partnerships.146 
The Washington plan describes how the state will calculate the consequence of a 
disaster, utilizing the categories for analysis (people, economy, environment, property) 
reflected in the acronym PEEP. Each category of PEEP has an assigned lead agency 
tasked to manage the consequence of an event affecting infrastructure within its scope of 
responsibility.147 The WIPP includes a developed resiliency program that also bears 
emulation. Finally, as identified in Chapter V of this thesis, the WIPP has developed a 
series of questions, each with a commensurate series of subquestions to enable the state 
to measure the progress of its protection plan.148 The questions allow the state to gauge 
those tasks accomplished toward the overall goal. Although the questions do not quantify 
the effectiveness of the efforts, they are a good starting point for the state of 
Massachusetts to incorporate into its strategy. 
In addition to incorporating some of the highlights from the Virginia or 
Washington plans, Massachusetts should develop more detailed goals, define who is 
responsible to accomplish those goals, and legislate funding to sustain the initiative. 
2. State Infrastructure Program 
The state of Massachusetts should create a broad infrastructure assurance program 
that focuses on assuring infrastructure’s consistent delivery of service. The program 
should be mandated in legislation much as the Office of Commonwealth Preparedness in 
Virginia. The infrastructure assurance (IA) program would maintain an inventory of the 
normal infrastructure as well as the “critical” infrastructure. Within the state 
infrastructure assurance program there should be a subgroup that focuses exclusively on 
the “critical” infrastructure in the state and on steps to insure that critical infrastructure is 
effectively secured from threats.  
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The infrastructure assurance program should be comprised of members 
representing multiple disciplines and multiple agencies from state and federal 
government and should include representatives from the private sector and academia. The 
private-sector representatives bring a wealth of experience in infrastructure assurance and 
understand the reality of market pressures with respect to corporate investments in 
infrastructure security. Academics bring fresh ideas, well-developed critical thinking 
skills, the willingness to challenge the status quo, and finally the capacity to research 
threats and solutions to mitigate threats. State government representatives should include 
law enforcement, fire services, emergency management, public health, risk management, 
transportation, and public services. A broad coalition of team members will insure a 
breadth of experience and professionalism and will act to spread the burden of 
inventorying and assessing infrastructure assets within the state across all interested 
entities. Considering the DoD’s task to secure the DIB and a state’s obligation to assist 
the DoD in that regard, the state’s National Guard should have representatives on the 
teams. 
The National Guard represents a broad spectrum of skill sets relevant to CIP, such 
as structural engineers, water and waste water treatment specialists, chemical munitions 
experts, intelligence analysts, law enforcement specialists, special operations forces with 
an appreciation of enemy nations and terrorist courses of action. More importantly, the 
military has a strong tradition of organizing complex tasks, developing strategies to affect 
goals, prioritizing effort, and leading complex programs. The military skill sets would 
enhance the IA program and provide an additional cross-learning opportunity for state 
CIP practitioners. 
The stable of IA program members could be likened to members of an orchestra 
with honed skills that—without organization—will not produce a symphony. Much like 
an orchestra is led by a maestro, the IA program will require a leader to arrange the 
appropriate scores or plans, cultivate members’ skills, and blend the skills to achieve an 
effective program. Massachusetts will need to find a homeland security maestro to lead 
the IA program. 
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D. STATE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM LEADER 
In Massachusetts, the current CIP program is directed by the state police, out of 
the Commonwealth Fusion Center. The state CIP program should become the 
infrastructure assurance program within the Secretary of Public Safety’s office, directed 
by the Under Secretary for Homeland Security. The under secretary is better positioned to 
engender the cooperation and goodwill of the many entities with a vested interest in CIP. 
The under secretary has access to the Secretary of Public Safety and by extension to the 
governor in the event that IA policy must be created or changed or that an errant public 
official needs to be guided back to the fold. 
Where resilience and emergency response are important elements of assuring 
infrastructure services, in Massachusetts the director of the Massachusetts Emergency 
Management Agency could lead the state infrastructure assurance program. The leader of 
the program should possess the organizational skills of a maestro and should demonstrate 
the ability to orchestrate a multiagency, multidiscipline effort to include state agencies, 
the private sector, academia, and federal support. The infrastructure assurance program 
director would need to establish state sector-specific agencies for each of the sectors, as 
was done in Virginia. Like Virginia, the sector-specific agencies should be tasked to 
develop sector-specific plans to help guide the state effort and to organize infrastructure 
partnerships and work groups. The emergency management component of the 
infrastructure assurance program should ensure outreach to the public by exploiting each 
city and town’s emergency manager’s relationship with the local community. 
An infrastructure assurance strategy requires a long-term commitment of political 
will and resources. A credible program and strategy is needed to maintain the support 
from all partners in order to be effective. Accurate threat analysis and risk management 
recommendations are critical to getting buy-in from the private sector and maintaining its 
support. The IA program manager would need to insure that his program’s 
recommendations to infrastructure owners and operators are solidly based on facts. 
To clarify, with respect to security after the 9/11 attack, the knee-jerk reaction to 
create physical security layers around infrastructure assets was unnecessary for many 
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assets and potentially a waste of money. Government-imposed physical security 
standards were more a demonstration of a desire to do something than a well-designed 
effort to implement a security program based upon an understanding of the threat and 
risk. However, one area that warrants the increased security attention is the cyber realm. 
The Marsh Commission’s focus on protecting infrastructure from the cyber threat 
was prescient then and remains so today. As recognized by the Marsh Commission, one 
area that does require physical security solutions, as well as security program and process 
solutions is cyber networks that connect infrastructure and SCADA systems that control 
them. For example, the daily operations of the power industry or water systems are 
controlled by SCADA systems. The state IA program director would need to ensure that 
strong network security protocols are exercised by state or local government–run 
infrastructure and to regulate network security standards for private-sector infrastructure. 
State infrastructure programs should develop and maintain working relationships with the 
regulatory agencies simply to retain situational awareness of a regulated sector’s 
compliance with standards. 
E. EDUCATE CIP PRACTITIONERS AND POLITICIANS 
The current CIP practitioner’s challenge to secure CIKR is compounded by a 
limited understanding of the composition of modern infrastructure, the interconnections 
and dependencies between assets within an infrastructure sector and across sectors, the 
nature and degree of threats that make CIKR vulnerable. There is also a lack of credible 
data that validates which protection actions are the most effective and resource efficient 
to ensure the delivery of service. The CIP practitioner should endeavor to educate himself 
on the types of infrastructure supporting his jurisdiction and to learn which elements of 
the infrastructure that, if damaged or lost, would truly create catastrophic results. An 
initial objective of the state strategy, then, is to promote a mechanism to develop the 
appropriate knowledge and skills in the infrastructure assurance program members and a 
corporate understanding of what is critical in the infrastructure sectors represented in 
Massachusetts. That corporate knowledge can be developed, consolidated, and shared in 
local colleges or in public-private partnerships.  
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The DHS offers infrastructure protection training in its CIKR Asset Protection 
Technical Assistance Program (CAPTAP) for infrastructure protection practitioners.149  
However, the course provides very basic knowledge and should not be seen as fulfilling 
the full body of requisite training for a professional infrastructure assurance team 
member. Additional CIKR vulnerability assessment skills can be gained through a 
working relationship with the National Guard and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 
IA team members could also join internationally recognized security groups like the 
American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) to enhance their understanding of 
critical infrastructure protection, industrial security, and physical security. Undergraduate 
or graduate-level education in homeland security is strongly recommended. Programs 
such as the graduate program or the executive leadership program offered at the Center 
for Homeland Security at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, should 
be a requisite for IA program managers. IA members’ participation in online college 
courses in infrastructure protection should be encouraged and funded. A recommended 
reading list of infrastructure protection writings from professional journals, academic 
research, and books should be made available to further expand IA members’ knowledge. 
The education and research efforts undertaken by George Mason University, 
partnering with government and private industry, addressed earlier in this thesis, should 
be a model for Massachusetts to mirror in partnership with one of its local universities. 
State infrastructure assurance practitioners can hone their skills in such an academic 
relationship. In an effort like that of GMU, academics benefit from interaction with 
private-sector and public-sector CIP practitioners who may share ideas about the 
direction that research should take or whether current research is on target. Current CIP 
practitioners and academics can each learn from the other. Ultimately, the participation of 
public- and private-sector CIP practitioners in CIP educational opportunities offered at 
universities and colleges will foster the development of future “maestros” and “virtuosos” 
of homeland security. 
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The director of the state IA program should engage local and state politicians to 
encourage their support for the goal of statewide infrastructure assurance. Political 
support can be made more effective by educating politicians about infrastructure 
assurance. For example, an infrastructure assurance–educated politician may choose not 
to pursue federal funding to secure infrastructure that is not critical or that does not 
warrant the investment of resources solely to placate his constituents. Politicians need to 
discipline themselves from complicating the state CIP practitioner’s efforts by attempting 
to unduly influence the definition of infrastructure as critical as a mechanism to acquire 
more federal funding. Political support and understanding of the infrastructure assurance 
goal may also help to eliminate the manipulation of public fears in order to gain 
consensus toward funding security programs that are not necessary. Politicians may best 
serve the infrastructure assurance effort by endorsing more research in the areas of 
infrastructure interdependencies, network vulnerabilities, and metrics to measure the 
effectiveness of infrastructure protection efforts by promoting education and training for 
CIP practitioners and by promoting public-private partnerships.  
F. DEVELOP PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND SECTOR 
SPECIFIC COUNCILS 
This thesis, the 2009 NIPP, and the infrastructure protection plans of Virginia and 
Washington, identify partnerships as an important component of their strategies. The 
state of Massachusetts should develop public-private partnerships to facilitate its 
infrastructure assurance initiative. The infrastructure assurance partnership should be 
organized along the lines of a megacommunity partnership. The megacommunity 
partnership concept primarily consists of three sectors: government, civil society, and 
business. As described by Mark Gerencser and his team, “To be effective, the 
megacommunity must represent and link the needs and perspectives of the three primary 
sectors. Order comes out of integrating and balancing the decision rights and roles of 
various players, that is, harnessing the dynamic tension.”150 The objective of 
Massachusetts state government should be to exploit the dynamic tension between the 
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three primary sectors mentioned above to unify infrastructure assurance partnerships 
toward the goal of achieving a common interest of infrastructure assurance.  
The state infrastructure assurance program should encourage the partnerships but 
not feel compelled to lead the partnership effort. For partnerships that include participants 
from academia and the private sector, principles of organization and leadership as 
recommended in The Starfish and the Spider should be considered.151 There does not 
need to be a single leader for these “starfish”-like partnerships but rather a common 
understanding of the objective of infrastructure assurance and a corporate desire to 
achieve it. The partnerships should be encouraged to self-govern their actions and work 
cohesively toward achieving the state’s strategic objectives. In these dynamic 
partnerships, solutions to infrastructure assurance will be discovered that are conceptually 
similar to discovering a “Blue Ocean”-like opportunity.152  
Members of the partnerships should include the local DHS or other federal 
entities involved in a particular infrastructure sector, state government homeland security 
practitioners, as well as elected officials, private-sector asset owners, and academia. The 
following represent partnership objectives: 
• Better understanding of the threat to and the vulnerabilities of 
infrastructure;  
• Identification of which infrastructure asset’s damage would result in a 
catastrophic event;  
• Development of methods to mitigate vulnerabilities to the “critical” assets; 
and 
• Development and fostering of a relationship based on a community of 
trust, where the members understand the information needs of their 
partners and accept that they are receiving threat information that will 
fulfill their objectives of ensuring the delivery of service;  
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ideas to solve an existing problem or new market space to exploit in order to achieve success. Infrastructure 
assurance partnerships can create innovative ways to assure the delivery of infrastructure service. See, Kim 
and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy. 
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• Promotion of research to understand the jurisdiction’s infrastructure and 
network interconnectivity issues; and 
• Promotion of effective leadership in the homeland security environment. 
In addition to developing partnerships, the state of Massachusetts would be well 
served to develop state sector-specific councils (SSSC) as did Virginia and Washington. 
The directors of the SSSCs would report to the director of the state infrastructure 
assurance program. One significant benefit of the SSSC is that the state is able to delegate 
responsibility for providing oversight of an entire infrastructure sector to an SSSC 
working on behalf of the state infrastructure assurance program. The director of the SSSC 
would function similarly to the section leader of an orchestra. He would be expected to 
prepare his associated infrastructure sector to perform at the direction of the state 
infrastructure protection maestro. The infrastructure assurance effort is too complex for 
one individual to manage without SSSCs. 
G. INFORMATION SHARING TO CREATE TRUST 
Information sharing issues in the homeland security environment are generally 
oriented around concerns about the federal government sharing intelligence and threat 
information with state government, with the private sector, or across any combination of 
those partners. The intelligence sharing concern is real in the minds of many homeland 
security partners. Accurate intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical level is 
necessary for infrastructure protection practitioners to develop appropriate security 
programs to mitigate potential threats. The intelligence needs to be accurate to help the 
infrastructure assurance effort focus protection resources where they are needed to deter 
or mitigate a real threat. The fact that many private-sector asset owners do not get 
actionable intelligence leads them to conclude that the government is unwilling to share 
relevant intelligence with them, rather than understanding that they are not getting the 
intelligence they expect because that type of intelligence is not available. 
Although not specifically proposed for intelligence sharing, the concept of 
“trusted information sharing platforms,” as proposed by Branscomb and Michel-Kerjan 
and addressed in Chapter IV of this thesis, could be a mechanism for ensuring that all the 
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partners in the state’s infrastructure assurance effort are comfortable that they have the 
best available intelligence of the likely threats at their facilities. The intelligence should 
also identify whether there is a known threat against specific facilities or types of 
facilities. State government needs to develop trusting relationships where its private-
sector partners accept that, when the state has actionable intelligence of a direct and 
predictable threat to their industry, they will be apprised of the information. 
In addition to intelligence information, more generalized information sharing is a 
necessary practice to achieve infrastructure protection and the assured delivery of service. 
For example, a public-private infrastructure assurance partnership should regularly share 
ideas on how to most effectively work together. According to a recent research report by 
the Multi-modal Information Sharing Team for the Boston area, “Participants 
consistently want information that will help them improve their operational decision 
making.”153 The Virginia Infrastructure Protection Plan recognizes the value of 
information sharing and recommends that partnerships be used to “exchange ideas, 
approaches, and best practices.”154 
Toward that end there has been extensive research undertaken to develop 
effective intelligence and threat information sharing processes. Important research by the 
Multimodal Information Sharing Team (MIST) at the Naval Postgraduate School is being 
conducted on behalf of the DHS to understand the information sharing needs of 
homeland security partners. A recently released MIST report articulates the results of 
their ongoing research enhanced by research conducted during a Boston-based work 
group. Collaborative capacity is identified as a necessity for effective information 
sharing. The recent report stresses that, to develop collaborative capacity, leadership 
involvement is necessary in the five domains of strategy and purpose, structure, lateral 
mechanisms, reward systems, and people. Leadership in this effort is clearly a role for the 
state of Massachusetts to undertake.  
                                                 
153 Salem, et al., Multimodal Information Sharing Team, 5. 
154 Commonwealth of Virginia, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 5. 
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Additional recommendations from the Boston MIST report should be factored 
into the Massachusetts infrastructure assurance strategy and program. For example, the 
workshop identified that participants believed that a formalized reward system 
recognizing collaborative efforts would encourage long-term participation from 
participants. The state infrastructure assurance program should insure that public-private 
collaboration receives appropriate rewards, whether through monetary recognition or 
through tax breaks. Ultimately, effective information sharing will have a strategic effect 
on the state’s overall infrastructure assurance goal and should remain a priority effort 
throughout. 
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